Daily Report

East Europe

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Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-026 *8 February 1995*

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East European Attempts To Achieve Market Economies

MS0302134995 London THE INDEPENDENT in English 3 Feb 95 p 19

[Article by Jonathan Eyal, director of studies at the Royal United Service Institute: "So Near And Yet So Trapped"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Romania and Bulgaria are this week joining the other former Communist countries of central Europe—Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary—in becoming associate members of the European Union. Officially at least, optimism prevails: after years of prevarication, most governments accept that the integration of eastern Europe is now inevitable, the only question is how quickly this can be achieved.

Yet behind the facade of bonhomie, eastern Europe is undergoing a profound crisis. Far from progressing steadily towards harmonisation with the rest of Europe, the east of the Continent appears to be stuck with governments that have all the trappings of Western-style democracy and the market economy, but little of the substance. Hungary, the pioneer of economic reforms since the Eighties, and the darling of Western investors, has three senior vacancies in its government that nobody wishes to fill—those of finance minister, central bank governor and head of the privatisation agency.

Poland, that redoubtable fighter against Soviet rule, has spent the past few weeks without either a foreign or defence minister. With the exception of the Czech Republic, Communists have returned to power in every east European state. To its Western neighbours, eastern Europe will remain an affliction for many years to come.

Only fools and economists ever believed the transition from Communism could be either smooth or painless. Yet to dismiss the current east European travails as just temporary setbacks on the irreversible path towards prosperity is equally wrong-headed.

The region is far from being a disaster area. From an almost total dependency on Soviet commerce, eastern Europe has redirected the bulk of its trade towards the West in just five years, an extraordinary accomplishment. During this period, the east Europeans have suffered drops of more than a third in their national wealth with remarkable stoicism: they have expressed their fury in the ballot boxes, rather than on the streets. In almost every country at least half of the national economy is now in private hands, and plans for further privatisation abound.

Nevertheless, the battle for the future of eastern Europe has just begun, and those who advocated a Western model of development appear to be on the losing side.

Every east European politician believes in the market economy, like every good Christian believes in the Ten Commandments, as a scheme that must be obeyed, but not just yet. Creating capitalism without the capital always involves a choice between the bad and the even worse.

A serious privatisation effort requires a careful calculation of the worth of individual enterprise and painstaking negotiations with potential investors, none of which was available to the east Europeans. Distributing state assets to the entire population in the form of privatisation vouchers has been, therefore, a quick method of subjecting the economy to the pressures of the market and a useful instrument for breaking the power of the Communist- dominated bureaucracy.

Throughout eastern Europe, the printing presses have been churning out vouchers designed to transform citizens into share owners. Although varying in complexity, these voucher schemes have two things in common: they do not bring any new capital into the market, nor do they make their bearers feel that they are true owners of new wealth.

Even in the Czech Republic, the most advanced and ardent privatiser, the vouchers are still not tradeable. When they are finally allowed to change hands, many Czech citizens are likely to discover they are the proud possessors of colourful bits of paper better suited for framing than trading. And in Romania, the region's laggard, the privatisation scheme is nothing but a wheeze: at least 70 per cent of the equity will remain in state hands.

It is possible to argue that, given the Communist legacy, not much more could have been expected. But eastern Europe is suffering from more than just post-Communist hangover. Throughout its history, the region has relied on the actions of governments, rather than on the initiative of its citizens: barring a few exceptions, the entire process of industrialisation in eastern Europe this century has been dictated from above. East Europeans regard the market economy as a byword for greater personal prosperity, but in the vaguest sense only, because they neither understand nor share its fundamental concepts.

Vaclav Klaus, the Czech Republic's premier and the only non- Communist leader still around, has survived precisely because he has confined his belief in Thatcherism to speeches rather than actions. And the rapid process by which the Hungarian government discarded its promise to respect the independence of the country's central bank is a sign that free market concepts, Western-style carry little attraction in the region.

Yet the reasons for the current disarray in economic policies go far deeper. The quick disposal or state assets is seen by most east Europeans as a fraud because they simply refuse to believe their labour over decades has been a total waste, and that the gigantic factories in which their fathers and mothers slaved away should now be sold for scrap metal. Yet this is precisely the message the markets convey, as the people of East Germany discovered.

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The recent decision of the Hungarian government to cancel the sale of a chain of hotels to foreign investors may have made it unpopular with potential foreign entrepreneurs, but it illustrates the growing unease of many east Europeans with the idea their national wealth can conceivably be sold for a song.

Disappointed with the slow pace of change, many Western economists are now tempted to argue that if eastern Europe had implemented economic reform before political liberalisation, it would today be enjoying the prosperity of some Asian countries. This is highly spurious. Unlike Asian nations which relied on rural societies for industrialisation, eastern Europe was already heavily industrialised, but producing the wrong goods at the wrong prices.

Isolated for decades from contact with the West, the bureaucracy- laden governments of eastern Europe are simply unable to provide the guidance necessary for a judicious allocation of investment resources. And, finally, the option of a trade-off between an open society and open markets never existed for eastern Europe: both were demanded by the population at the same time.

The message of eastern Europe is precisely that it does not conform to any of the existing economic models. It is not a disaster area, nor is it ripe for dictatorship. But it will not thrive either, at least not for a long time yet. Its existence will be punctuated by periods of semi-chaos, like that which Poland experiences today, interspersed with authoritarian, if ephemeral, leaders.

For years to come it will remain a region in which the private sector produces most of the wealth, but is also expected to sustain large, loss-making state enterprises for political reasons. In short, eastern Europe is returning to its history: so similar to other Europeans, and yet so infuriatingly different.

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Statistics Show 30 Percent of Electricity Stolen

AU0702185495 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 7 Feb 95 p 7

[Article by Albert Nikolla: "Mass Thefts From the Albanian Electricity Grid"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Public consumption of electricity between 1990 and 1994 soared in a geometric progression. Statistics from the Electrical Energy Cooperation cited by its director, Ymer Balla, shed light on this phenomenon. Public electricity consumption in 1990 amounted to 292 million kwh, or only 6.5 percent of national production. It rose to 511 million kwh in 1991, 859 million kwh in 1992, 1.293 billion kwh in 1993, and 1.6 billion kwh in 1994, or more than 40 percent of the entire gross national electricity production.

This growth in public electricity consumption has been accompanied by increased technical wastage on the grid, or, more accurately, the massive theft of electricity by irresponsible cosumers. Comparing the annual production and distribution figures, the corporation's specialists have reached the conclusion that the extent of theft amounts to 30 percent of the total electricity production, a highly disturbing phenomenon.

Thefts began in 1991, when consumers themselves destroyed an enormous number of electricity meters. This meant that not every consumer's consumption of electricity could be inspected, while production figures in kilowatt hours were known. As a result, the balance between production and public consumption was accompanied by large-scale devastation on the grid because of overloading. Electricity consumption even increased in the countryside, and, contrary to the usual trends, a balance in public consumption of 50 percent in the towns and 50 percent in the countryside was reached. As a result of the damage to the grid caused by overloading, the Electrical Energy Corporation was obliged to make an additional investment of $40 million between 1992 and 1994, causing further financial problems for itself. Asked about how to solve the problem of thefts from the grid, Mr. Balla says that legislation exists but is not enforced. Electricity is a commodity like all other goods produced by the country's industry, and its theft must be punished according to the law. Drawing parallels with other countries that have experienced the same problem—such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey in the 1980's—Albania must follow their example by punishing thieves according to the laws in force or by deploying special forces, as the Turkish Government did, normalizing the situation within two weeks. It is not simply a matter of the $20 million lost to the corporation through theft; the extent of this threat threatens to devastate the distribution grid, with unprecedented consequences for the entire population. What can be said in conclusion is that the more than sixfold increase in public electricity consumption within a short time, together with the mass thefts, has created an intolerable situation, and the government must take concrete steps to reduce electricity consumption by securing other energy sources, and strictly enforcing the law before it is too late.

Excessive Reliance on Monetarist Policies Noted

AU0802090495 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 7 Feb 95 p 8

[Article by Dr. Ahmet Ceni: "Unemployment, the Main Indicator of Macroeconomic Stabilization"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The reforms planned for Albania by the IMF program, and in general applied by the Albanian Government, cover the entire spectrum of economic institutions, including the fiscal system, monetary policy, incomes, prices, trading policy, small-, medium-, and large-scale privatization, agricultural policy, the banks, modernization of the infrastructure, etc. The reforms have been applied in three important directions:

First, the reform has aimed to stimulate production by creating suitable relations of production and exchange.

Second, it will determine whether the country will be integrated into the orbit of Europe or remain a peripheral adjunct.

Third, it is being carried out on the basis of foreign support until 1996, as forecast by the IMF's plans.

The aim of all these measures has been a rapid transition to a market economy and the stabilization of economic life. How well have these objectives been achieved?

Perhaps the reasons for their lack of success must be sought not in the time frame of the application of the therapy, i.e. in whether it has been "shock" or "gradual" therapy, but in its content, which has, in my opinion, been mistaken in several directions. As my intention is to study the phenomenon of unemployment, I will not dwell on an analysis of the therapy and its results in macroeconomic stabilization, but I will provide an overview of the degree of economic stabilization in Albania. These indicators cover the entire transition period and are compared with theoretical norms of economic stability:

	Norm	Actual		
		1992	1993	1994
1. Unemployment (percent)	5-6	44.5	22.3	18
2. Real growth of GDP (percent)	Stable	- 10	+ 11	+ 8

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3. Inflation (percent)	Low, 2-3	237	31	16
4. Currency exchange rate	Stable	Unstable	Stable	Stable
5. Foreign trade balance ($ million)	Balanced	- 453	- 455	- 461
6. Gross domestic product per person minimum	$700-800	$348.50	$314	$348.50
7. Urban unemployment (percent)	5-6	50	40	34.08

The first striking fact about these indicators is that monetary indicators (inflation and the lek exchange rate) are tending toward stabilization, while production and unemployment indicators are still far from normal. This situation arises from the application of the liberal philosophy according to which stabilization is achieved by a stable currency, even in an economy in transition—even though it is well known that the results of such policies have not been good even in Chile, Argentina, Peru, Africa, etc.

Can one call stable an economy with overall employment of 22.3 percent, which produces one-half of what is necessary for minimum subsistence and has a foreign trade deficit of about $450 million and urban unemployment of almost 35 percent? Reducing inflation to a certain level is a proper objective and an effective measure helping to restore the economy, but curing this disease alone in a small organism that must grow and is suffering from many other ailments means that these other illnesses will never ever be cured, in no matter how long a time. This is because Albania is both a developing country and a country in transition. Thus, achieving stability requires attention to the matter of reducing unemployment. This is a necessary strategy because, alongside the strong ties between unemployment and inflation, there is also a vital link between unemployment, production growth, the foreign trade balance, production per person, etc. On this basis, economic policy must concern itself more with improving these indicators, and as a result unemployment will also fall.

I think that progress in the stabilization of the economy is connected to the degree of restructuring and the structural transformation of the economy, which presupposes the achievement of a degree of supply and demand in the labor market. Supply policy in Albania involves increasing the number of jobs in two main areas. The first involves offering jobs through realizing the current potential of the Albanian economy, which is calculated to amount to $1.8 billion to $2 billion million, compared to $1,200,000 today. The second involves the further growth of the economy. Realizing the potential for production would greatly help reduce unemployment, as well as rescue the economy from collapse. At present, we are misusing the country's economic potential, especially in agriculture, the food industry, engineering, the chemical industry, etc.

This goal is vital because of the place Albania must occupy in the international division of labor and the need to increase as far as possible the complexity of labor tasks performed. As is well known, the more complex the tasks that are performed, the more jobs are created and the faster the country passes from an undeveloped to a developing or developed country. An analysis of the current situation shows that those who have compiled economic policy throughout the transition period have failed to bear this principle in mind. This is shown by the fact that we import about 80 percent of our food products of agricultural origin, without counting industrial products, which are virtually all imported. This means that all the foreign currency that enters Albania is used for consumption instead of for investment in production. In effect, the money our refugees earn in Italy or Greece goes back to where it came from in the form of imports of various groceries or industrial products, while some also goes to other countries—such as Bulgaria, Turkey, Russia, etc.—that are important sources of imports.

Emigration will help toward Albania's development when we start to invest this money in production. This will happen when our foreign trade accounts are balanced or deficit is made inconsiderable. This calls for a new conception of certain aspects of economic policy, the better practical application of existing legislation, and changes to substantial portions of this legislation. Economic policy must be guided in a more scientific and less stereotyped fashion, in ways appropriate to Albanian conditions, with the aim of leading the Albanian economy toward stability and growth, so that it may use 100 percent instead of 70 percent of its current potential and so that it may increase this potential in order to ensure for every Albanian the necessary minimum of gross domestic product per person, which is calculated to be about $800.

In my view, this should be the strategy of economic development in Albania. Of course, it will not be easy to realize and will be especially difficult today, when economic policy has in some ways pursued the opposite direction, serious damage has been done, and a total turnabout is required.

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Economic Cooperation With Ukraine Examined

AU0702145595 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 7 February Kiril Tsochev, deputy prime minister and minister of trade and foreign economic relations, met with Oleksandr Vorobyov, Ukraine's ambassador to Bulgaria. Vorobyov stressed the satisfaction of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma with the talks and cooperation agreements he signed during Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev's official visit to Ukraine.

An agreement on industrial production sharing and specialization in machine-building, agriculture, and the pharmaceutical industry will be prepared. Experts from the two countries are working on the preparation of a bilateral agreement on cooperation in mutual trade and on the draft agreement on avoiding double taxation.

The establishment of a joint Bulgarian-Ukrainian Trade Bank is also being prepared.

Police Remove Protesters in Sapareva Banya

AU0802124095 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning the police and an Interior Ministry detachment took lawful actions to allow construction workers free access to the Dzherman-Skakavitsa water diversion project in Sapareva Banya. The first detailed information comes from the chief of the National Police.

The police action on the road to the Dzherman-Skakavitsa project in Sapareva Banya consisted of removing representatives of the protest committee to ensure access for the construction workers. This was the explanation National Police Chief Colonel Khristo Gatsov gave our reporter Lyubomir Rozenshtayn. Col. Gatsov said that no arrests were made during the action but measures were taken to temporarily isolate the more unruly and noisy participants in the protest.

According to Gatsov, there is no truth in the report that the national radio received from Sapareva Banya residents to the effect that a number of persons were beaten by the police. Force was applied only in a single isolated case, where a protester behaved aggressively toward a police officer.

For its part, the initiative committee in Sapareva Banya declared that beatings of peaceful protesters, women, and children have taken place. (?Lina) Nesheva explained over the telephone that officers of a special police unit, whom she described as wearing protective helmets, acted brutally and without good cause, arrested many of the protesters, loaded them onto two trucks, and drove them off to an unknown destination.

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Opposition Responds to U.S. Human Rights Report

AU0702135295 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 3 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by "has, ce": "Payne Partly Agrees With U.S. Criticism of Human Rights in the Czech Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Jiri Payne, chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Committee (Civic Democratic Party), considers the U.S. criticism of the observance of human rights in the Czech Republic justified on some points.

Payne agrees that Articles 102 and 103 of the Penal Code concerning the defamation of the president and the state are discriminatory. Namely, they create an inequality between the president and other constitutional officials because criticism of the head of state can in certain instances be regarded as defamation, and, therefore, it is a punishable offense. However, the government is preparing a new penal code, and therefore Payne considers the statement of the U.S. Department of State somewhat rash. The criticism is justified, he says, but the government has the best intentions of correcting the mistake.

Regarding the reproaches of the Americans concerning the Czech bias against Romanies, Payne said that the principle of civic society is a "traditional attribute of Czech democracy." No one here is conducting any discrimination against Romanies, he emphasized, and pointed out that, if expressions of racism are encountered, they are immediately prosecuted.

[Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 3 February on page 1 reports on the reaction to the above U.S. report by the chairman of the opposition: "Milos Zeman, chairman of the Czech Social Democratic Party, declared that he understands the stance of the U.S. Department of State. He is aware of the protection of minorities being a part of democracy. 'Nevertheless, we should be more concerned with the fact that the environmental groups of this country appeared on the Security Information Service (BIS) list as extremist organizations,' Zeman said. He considers this true minority discrimination. He added that the U.S. side was justified in pointing out the problem of insufficient protection of minorities like the Romanies. It should have paid more attention, however, to the 'minority of environmental activists.'"]

Commentary: Report 'Flattering'

AU0702135195 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 4 Feb 95 p 5

[Commentary by Petr Dudek: "A Misunderstood Report"]

[FBIS Translated Text] No grounds exist for refusing to accept what the U.S. Department of State "Report on Human Rights," published on 1 February, says about the Czech Republic. This for two reasons: First, by a negative stand with respect to the report, we would join the countries that feel harmed by this material and who have already sent their protests to Washington. (The most vocal were the objections from communist China.) The governments of these countries will not achieve much by these protests. The second reason we should not reject the report, particularly without studying it first, is perhaps even more crucial: Its content actually is rather flattering toward the Czech Republic.

This year's "Report on Human Rights" (the U.S. Department of State has been preparing this material for the Congress every year for the past 17 years) assesses the state of human rights in the Czech Republic in a perceptive and matter-of-fact manner. According to U.S. diplomatic sources, the situation in this sphere is "very good" in the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, critical observations can be found in the report. Let us note that the U.S. study is prepared for documentary purposes only and that it is not an interference in the internal affairs of our state and that the Americans do not expect under any circumstances that the Czech party would in any way answer to them for any of the conceivable criticism.

A discussion has already been launched over the report. It is typical that the people who actually studied it were not always the ones to comment on it. Vaclav Klaus, for instance, quickly described it as distorted and simplifying because he had only a "Xeroxed clipping" from the text at his disposal.

As could be predicted, most attention (and contempt) was attracted by those parts of the report that refer to the status of the Romany population in the Czech Republic. One can demur at the increased interest of the Americans in the living conditions and the civic, political, and social status of Romanies here. Nevertheless, the interest of the Americans in racial coexistence anywhere in the world, not only here, is easy to explain: The United States is a country that experienced a formidable struggle for the termination of racial segregation. It has in fresh memory its own traumas caused by the insufficient guard against racial bias (let us recall the unrest in Los Angeles in the spring of 1992). (Incidentally, the "Report on Human Rights" does not shirk even the situation in the United States itself.)

"The most important issue in the sphere of human rights (in the Czech Republic) is the widespread bias against the Romany minority and the inability (or unwillingness) on the part of the government to take a stand against this," says the report, prepared on the basis of contacts with various Czech government and nongovernment experts.

The report never directly accuses the Government of the Czech Republic of discriminatory measures. Nor does it express any suspicion that the people in government service spray-paint on the walls "Gas the Gypsies," as one would deduce from the exaggerated reaction of the

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Czech authorities. It only states that the stand assumed by the government clerks in the Czech Republic and also by ordinary citizens is rather apprehensive.

Can such a statement be rejected as distorted? Let us only recall the trial of the skinheads who chased a group of Romanies, in front of several dozen locals, into the Otava River in Pisek two years ago. One of the Romanies, Tibor Danihel, drowned in the river. The trial dragged on through the entire year and eventually, in December, the court delivered very light sentences—because of the dearth of condemning evidence. So, the Romanies present took justice into their own hands and settled the score with one of the accused on the spot—with a knife. The pendulum of vengeance swayed to the other side. What helped it swing was nothing but the unwillingness to stand up uncompromisingly against racial bias—both on the part of the citizens and on the part of government employees.

Chairmen Kalvoda, Lux View Situation in Coalition

AU0702213595 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 6 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by "mrk": "Chairmen Kalvoda and Lux Deny Any Notion of a Bloc Being Formed Within the Coalition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance] Chairman Jan Kalvoda and KDU-CSL [Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party] Chairman Josef Lux denied in an interview with a LIDOVE NOVINY correspondent any notion of a bloc being formed within the coalition that would consist of these two parties.

Roman Ceska, chairman of the National Property Fund, who announced his entry into ODA politics, spoke about the need of such a close alliance in a recent interview with LIDOVE NOVINY. According to Ceska, these two parties must within the coalition jointly control the ODS [Civic Democratic Party]. "The natural mission of the ODA and KDU-CSL is, in addition to the administration of their departments, to revive interest in the spheres the ODS is neglecting." They should do so, first of all, within the coalition and, if that is not possible, in public.

The KDU-CSL chairman rejects the idea of such blocs. "There are 18 months until elections. The coalition will have a lot to do within the framework of its policy statement. At any rate, it must work as an integral entity. True, occasionally our friends from the ODS and we are pushed into different stands, but it is not our wish to form blocs within the coalition," Lux said. In this context, he also rejected all speculations regarding the formation of right- and left-wing coalitions. Talks concerning specific coalitions should be conducted, according to him, only according to the results in parliamentary elections. "Instead of such nonsensical debates, the coalition should be working on implementing its program," he added.

ODA Chairman Jan Kalvoda does not long for the formation of two mini blocs within the coalition either. According to him, the coalition communication between his party and their People's partners is in many respects on a very good level: Nevertheless, he considers it a priority that such relations exist in the entire coalition. Therefore, it is necessary to appeal to the entire coalition to improve the relations between the individual parties. This has been recently prevented by the conduct of the KDS [Christian Democratic Party]: "Credibility cannot be recovered if, when it suits one of the parties, it places itself in the role of an arbiter, who towers in the coalition and decides what is and what is not right." Several statements by the KDS, in which sharp criticism was voiced of the alliance, Kalvoda assesses in the spirit of the recent statements by the ODS chairman. Klaus announced last week that he expects something more profound in the relations with the KDS than just an electoral coalition.

SPR-RSC Charge Ruml With 'Propagating' Drugs

LD0802111395 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0600 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia [SPR-RSC] has lodged a complaint with the highest state representation demanding that criminal proceedings be initiated against Interior Minister Jan Ruml for propagating the use of drugs. The SPR-RSC experts commission for science, education, and culture is also demanding the immediate dismissal of the interior minister and that he be handed over for criminal investigation.

According to the SPR-RSC, the interior minister committed a criminal offense at a press conference on 6 February by calling for legalizing the use of drugs.

CR Negotiates With Russia on Nuclear Waste

95CH0097D Prague PRAGUE POST in English 3 Jan 95 p 5

[Article by Maggie Ledford Lawson: "Czechs and Russians Forge New Nuclear Ties"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Trading in nuclear material between Prague and Moscow has been a hot topic lately—with smugglers trying to peddle stolen plutonium and the Czech government drawing criticism for a controversial plan to send nuclear waste to Russia for reprocessing.

But the negative publicity hasn't kept the two countries from quietly moving forward with plans for future nuclear cooperation under an agreement reached in Moscow in early December.

The agreement—which includes the controversial clause about waste reprocessing—will allow Russia to compete for the chance to supply enriched uranium to the Soviet-designed nuclear plant at Temelin, south Bohemia. And

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it can vie for a contract to sell fabricated fuel to the plant, once current contracts with U.S.-based Westinghouse Electric Corp. expire.

Ironically, one main argument for completing the reactors at Temelin was that the Czech Republic would not have to rely so heavily on Russia, the sole source of the country's natural gas, for its energy needs.

But Czech officials say that the agreement keeps Russia sufficiently at arm's length to avoid overdependence on its fuel.

"We see no reason to discriminate against that country," said Jaroslav Mil, director of the nuclear fuel section for CEZ, the state-run utility in charge of power plants.

The relationship between the two countries won't be as cozy as in the past. Russia had asked to be the single supplier of enriched uranium for this country's nuclear reactors, but Czech negotiators turned down that request, according to officials at the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

But the negotiators did open the door for Russia to reprocess nuclear waste from the Czech Republic, if such a deal becomes economically feasible. Russia would return to the Czech Republic all materials created during the reprocessing.

That clause of the agreement sparked protests from the environmental group Greenpeace, which argued that plutonium, an end product of the reprocessing, could eventually fall into the hands of terrorists.

Plutonium is a major component of nuclear bombs. And the Czech Republic already appears to be a way station for nuclear materials. On December 19, for instance, Czech police arrested two Russian citizens and one Czech nuclear physicist for trying to smuggle enriched uranium through the country.

Ivan Novak, director of nuclear installations at the Ministry of Trade and Industry, said Greenpeace's concerns regarding the Russian reprocessing of Czech nuclear waste are baseless. The government will require that Russia return the nuclear material in a form that will allow it to be loaded into a reactor, said Novak.

"We don't want metallic plutonium (which could be used in a bomb)," he said.

The government already depends on Russia for the enriched uranium and fabricated fuel used at the Dukovany nuclear facility.

Russia "pressed hard" for permission to serve as the sole source of enriched uranium for both of the country's nuclear facilities, but "we didn't want to take that approach," said Miroslav Tvrznik, director of the nuclear engineering section at the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

Russia competed with Westinghouse for the initial right to do fuel fabrication for the Temelin plant, but the government chose the U.S. company as the supplier, in part because the Russian fabrication design for Temelin had some technical problems.

Westinghouse also won the contract for updating and completing construction of two reactors at Temelin, which is a VVER-1000 model facility designed by the Soviets.

Gabe Toth, a spokesman for Westinghouse, said his company plans to do the fuel fabrication in a plant in South Carolina.

Once Westinghouse's four-year contract is up, CEZ will decide on the new supplier of the fabricated fuel for Temelin.

In an era of dwindling interest in nuclear power, competition is intense between nations with the capacity to prepare uranium for use in power plants. Only a handful of countries, including the United States, France, Germany, Japan and Russia, have the capacity to enrich uranium and fabricate fuel.

Nations that have uranium mines also are fighting hard for contracts. The Czech government has made attempts to protect its beleaguered mining industry by requiring any country that provides processed fuel to Temelin or Dukovany either to purchase the fuel in this country or to buy the equivalent amount here.

Czech uranium prices are "definitely higher" than the world average of $18-$25 for short-term contracts, said Jan Kafka, manager of the director's office at Diamo, the state company that operates the uranium mines.

Some 800 of 2,000 workers at Dolni Rozinka in Moravia, one of the Czech Republic's two uranium mining areas, were forced to take 16 days off starting December 1 because business was so slow.

At Stas pod Ralskem, a mining area in northern Bohemia, workers at two mines, Dul hlubinne tezby and Dul chemicke tezby, are gradually being phased out. The mines employ about 1,600 people.

Kafka hopes demand will improve once Temelin goes on line.

If Westinghouse keeps on schedule, the first reactor should be running by September 1996. However, some subcontractors have failed to deliver materials needed for the project in a timely fashion, prompting speculation that the startup of the reactor will be delayed by months or even years.

Keen Competition for Tank Modernization

95CH0097C Prague PRAGUE POST in English 3 Jan 95 p 5

[Article by Brendan McNally: "Tank Plan Spurs Competition"]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bratislava—Skoda Plzen chief executive Lubomir Soudek recently declared a "clear victory" in a still-undecided Czech army tank modernization program—and he boasted that his company could soon be manufacturing a new anti-aircraft system.

But weapons manufacturers in Slovakia have questioned whether Skoda is capable of pulling off the tank contract. And army officials say they have no plans to buy the anti-aircraft system.

"Soudek and I have got a big bet riding on this one," said Karol Droppa, deputy director of the Slovak Economy Ministry's special production section. "I'll owe him 100 bottles of champagne if he upgrades a single tank. Soudek may know plenty about textile machinery, but he knows nothing about making tanks."

In an interview late last month with the Czech dailies LIDOVE NOVINY and MLADA FRONTA DNES, Soudek said his tank-building consortium, the RDP Group, was already negotiating with the army and would have a modernized prototype for the T-72 tank ready by 1996. He said the company could start making its first deliveries by 1997.

But Droppa said Skoda can't fulfill the contract without Slovak help, since Skoda transferred its heavy armaments to Slovakia 30 years ago. Skoda lacks the know-how and the specialized equipment necessary to build or upgrade armored vehicles, he said.

Soudek also mentioned his intention to produce the Strop, a truck-mounted anti-aircraft gun-and-rocket system, which had been the sole remaining joint Czech-Slovak weapons development program. Soudek said the army could have it by 1998.

Soudek failed to mention that the Czech army had already bailed out of the program during the summer, after being faced with skyrocketing development costs and discouraging test results.

"As far as the Czech army is concerned, Strop is dead as a program," said Frantisek Veprek, director of the Czech Defense Ministry's main office for material and technical support. "It doesn't meet the army's needs. We do have a requirement for a self-propelled anti-aircraft system, but it is not an immediate priority."

Skoda spokesman Jaroslav Hudec would not provide any elaboration of Soudek's statements. "We stand by everything that was printed in MLADA FRONTA," he said.

Although Strop currently exists in a programmatic limbo as a Slovak-only program, the Israeli defense firm Rafael has expressed interest in helping the Slovaks revive the program. While the Slovaks have continued to invite Czech cooperation in supporting their joint defense industrial base, the Czechs have appeared to have little interest in working with the Slovaks.

Vladimir Suman, chairman of the Czech parliament's defense and security committee, dismissed the importance of the two countries' joint industrial base by saying: "Slovakia is now an independent state with its own budget. Sure we are interested in cooperating with them, but only under the same conditions as any other country, with no special considerations."

Some observers attributed the Czech disinterest in Slovakia to a desire to cut links with a country that, unlike the Czech Republic, is by necessity still linked to the former Soviet Union. Droppa and other Slovak sources pointed out that, since the Slovak heavy-armaments base also includes many Czech suppliers, it is in the Czech interest to cooperate. Droppa said the Slovak tank industry is interested in cooperating with Skoda, but it has yet to receive any overtures from the Czechs.

However, Czech Defense Ministry spokesman Col. Jiri Sila made it plain that the army was not interested.

"What they do in Slovakia is a purely commercial concern and of no interest to us," he said.

But it is clear that the race to modernize T-72 tanks is on. Even Western defense contractors are eager to get aboard what many see as one of the last great defense markets. There are at least 8,000 T-72 tanks in operation outside the former Soviet Union and probably twice as many inside.

In Slovakia, two competing groups have been set up—one teamed with the Israeli companies Elbit and Elop, and the other with the Belgian company SABCA and the French SFIM.

At the same time, the Western engine manufacturers Wartsila/SACM and MTU are both attempting to get aboard the Czech and Slovak programs. The U.S. engine manufacturer Allison, having failed to find a Czech partner because all of its technical specifications were in inches rather than metric increments, has reportedly joined up with the Israeli-led team.

Having obtained a green light from parliament for its five-year defense budget and modernization plan, the Czech army is not expected to waste any time in announcing tenders for tank upgrades.

Defense Minister Vilem Holan has stressed that future tenders will favor companies that can provide high levels of domestic content. Veprek had stated earlier that the Defense Ministry might utilize "narrow tenders" rather than full public tenders in order to select a contractor.

With a new coalition government being formed in Bratislava, the Slovak army modernization plan and defense budget are also expected to be passed by parliament soon.

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Comment on U.S. Report on Human Rights

Vindication of Cabinet's Record

AU0602203395 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 3 Feb 94 p 1

[Commentary by Lubomir Hudo in the "Public Matter" editorial column]

[FBIS Translated Text] Is it possible in a shackled country, in which human rights are being violated and in which ruthless diktat rules, to attack, slander, insult, and play down in the newspapers, magazines, and radio and television programs—under the disguise of well-founded analyses and under the mask of political satire—everything linked to the nation's and state's past, present, and future? Is it possible in such a country to publicly assault verbally, in pictures, and in letters everything that does not conform with one's "only correct" idea on state and social matters?

In shackled countries rebels, eternal gripers, and notorious opposers end up in labor camps designed for reeducation, in secret police torture cells, or they simply disappear forever. Or they are brought to heel mentally, physically, and materially to such an extent that they are rendered harmless. Such things occur in famous democracies as well, albeit in a very elegant manner.

Many people in this country have built thriving businesses by purposefully creating an abhorrent picture of Slovakia. However, they are not sufficiently active because, so far, they have not impressed the U.S. Department of State. In its report on the observance of human rights legislation, our country does not feature as a Balkan cauldron with suffering citizens. The U.S. Congress learns from the report that newspapers are appearing in Slovakia that express the entire spectrum of political opinions, that the cabinet funds the most varied activities of the ethnic minorities, that members of the Hungarian minority find the doors widely open for them at all levels of the country's political and economic life, that the freedoms of movement, travel, association, assembly, and religion are guaranteed, and that trade unions and representatives of domestic and foreign nongovernmental human rights organizations are working without government interference. Obviously, it is high time for the notorious slanderers to prepare another blackening "bomb."

Moravcik's Cabinet Deserves Credit

AU0702142595 Bratislava SME in Slovak 4 Feb 95 p 4

[Commentary by Juraj Hrabko: "Report from the United States and Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The message that the U.S. State Department sent to Slovakia a few days ago sounds, in the current situation, unusually favorable and encouraging for the coming days. The report drafted by the world power on the observance of human rights in the Slovak Republic last year is positive, even though it deals with such burning Slovak issues as, for instance, ethnic minorities and the media.

Despite the fact that the report on Slovakia is 15 pages long, the TA SR has transmitted only one of them—the summary. Until we obtain the entire text concerning Slovakia from the United States, let us try to look with our own eyes not only at the observance of the aforementioned rights in Slovakia, but also at who, and in which way, deserves credit for it.

The annual report from the United States says that the government financed the cultural, educational, broadcasting, and publishing activities of the major ethnic minorities. In addition, the government enabled the education of ethnic minorities according to their demands and its financial possibilities. The passage of the laws on signposts with local identification and on names in territories inhabited by ethnic Hungarians contributed to easing certain ethnic tensions. With respect to the media, the report states that numerous newspapers, magazines, and other publications expressing the whole spectrum of political opinions were published freely throughout last year. Moreover, at least according to the TA SR version, the report quotes Vladimir Meciar statements, in which he confirms the determination of the new government to observe freedom of speech, media independence, and the rights of ethnic minorities.

What the report does not say, however, is how the prime minister intends to achieve this. It is therefore worth noting that Vladimir Meciar chaired the cabinet for only about three months last year. It is thus more than obvious that it was not Meciar's cabinet, but Moravcik's, to which the United States issued the report card on the observance of human rights in Slovakia. After all, it is Moravcik's cabinet that deserves credit for the approval of the laws on names, surnames, [bilingual] road signs, and [birth, marriage, and death] registers. On the other hand, the three months of Meciar's government were marked by the preferential treatment of the government daily [REPUBLIKA] through paid advertisements; by the physical attack on several journalists, in which the police refused to interfere; by the illegal switching off of radio transmitters; by one party seizing control over electronic media, by the demarche of the European Union member countries; and by efforts to forcibly, establish, with assistance from state power, a competitive environment for the daily press. Whether only the TA SR item, or also the U.S. report is silent on these facts is not yet known. In view of the fact that the U.S. Congress deals with the report on the observance of human rights every year, I propose to Vladimir Meciar the conclusion of an agreement that is exceedingly advantageous for him. He will leave periodicals and other publications, including 20 dailies, in peace, and we, along with the United States, will not reproach him for the abolition of the other 41 dailies in Slovakia [allusion to Meciar's claim, made on Slovak Television

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on 31 January, that there are 61 dailies on the Slovak market, which he says is "too many," although, according to the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists, there are only 20].

OCSE Official Approves Slovak Minority Policy

LD0702144795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council, today received Max van der Stoel, the high commissioner of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], in the Slovak parliament building in Bratislava.

They discussed in particular the position of national minorities and, in this connection, also the alternative school system [in which some subjects are taught in a minority language and some in Slovak] and the territorial and administration division of the state.

Van der Stoel conveyed his satisfaction with the basic line of Slovakia's policy on minorities which he described as better worked-through than in Hungary. In his words, the official state policy of Hungary in the last few decades was to assimilate the minorities living on its territory.

The OCSE representative supported Ivan Gasparovic's view on the need to introduce the alternative school system also stated that knowledge of the official language of this or that state is not a step toward assimilation but toward advancement.

Official, President Meet

LD0702154795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Max van der Stoel, high commissioner of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] in charge of national minorities, continues his two-day working visit to Slovakia. He was received earlier in the morning by Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council, and then by Slovak President Michal Kovac.

After the meeting with the president, our editor Jan Baranek asked Vladimir Stevko, the president's spokesman, to assess the meeting:

[Begin recording] [Stevko] The president's meeting with the high commissioner was matter-of-fact. The two officials agreed that Slovakia's active participation in dealing with minorities' issues, especially with regard to the Budapest summit [5-6 December 1994], is very good. The high commissioner acknowledged Slovakia's share in these processes.

There were three main issues on the agenda of the meeting today. First was the issue of the alternative education system. The second issue was the territorial-administrative division of Slovakia. The high commissioner very clearly stated that it was neither plausible nor realistic to set up one unit for the Hungarian minority, stretching from the western to the eastern border. Other factors, namely economic, geographic, transportation, and others were also to be considered when dealing with the issue.

The third point on the agenda was the activity of the group of experts chaired by the high commissioner. [passage omitted]

[Baranek] Did the president and the high commissioner discuss the territorial-administrative division as proposed by the government?

[Stevko] The discussion on this was not very detailed. However, the idea of a unified territory inhabited by the Hungarians was rejected. Of course, there are three alternative solutions, setting up seven, 12, or 16 territorial-administrative units. Naturally, with regard to the number of inhabitants, the Hungarians would not have majority representation under either of these alternative solutions. However, the president said he believes that through legislative measures it will be possible to guarantee all relevant minority rights even in these territorial-administrative units. [end recording] [passage omitted]

ZRS Power Seizure Compared to 1948 Takeover

AU0702185595 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 4 Feb 95 p 3

[Commentary by Renata Ruzickova: "February Is Here Again..."]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] It was February 1948 and class struggle was raging. In the name of future prosperity and the right to work, the new government established order in central state administration and started doing the same in the districts. Overnight, it dismissed the respected and wise district school inspector and rule over the teachers was assumed by a member of the proletariat—a tailor's apprentice. [passage omitted]

Almost half a century has elapsed since February 1948. [passage omitted] And what is happening around us today only proves that we are incorrigible. Parliament has completely confused the democratic principle whereby the majority decides with unthinking diktat by the majority. How would it otherwise be possible for a bricklayer party chairman to defeat in the contest for the post of deputy chairman of parliament a professor of law and deputy chairman of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly? A bulldozer operator has been placed at the head of parliament's Mandate and Immunity Committee because, supposedly, legal education can be replaced by a proper distance from the problems. The highest inspector in the state is a builder [reference to Stefan Bajanik, chairman of the Supreme Inspection

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Office] who, admittedly, lacks the required qualification but can boast of ties with StB [communist-era secret police] informers....

The example set at the center is becoming a contagious disease for the countryside. While only a week ago we could dismiss the intention to appoint workers as deputy district office chairmen as a malicious rumor, in Presov this is the reality today. The district office chairman comes from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia while his deputy, a former car mechanic on a disability pension, comes from the ZRS. Who cares that university education is prescribed for this post? The institute of exemptions, introduced by the communists, comes in handy. No one is in the least bothered by the fact that the district's residents will be thrown upon an incompetently administered district office with their problems, needs, but also their future. [passage omitted]

A reader from Topolcany who was afraid of introducing himself phoned us: "I have been working in the state administration for 20 years but I have never experienced anything like what is being prepared now. The communists, too, used to place their own people at the head of districts. But they at least saw to it that these people had education...."

It is February 1995 and...is raging. What is raging, in fact? Quest for revenge? Craving for power? Longing for wealth? The motives probably differ from place to place. At any rate, what is happening—and, according to reports from the districts, is still to happen—is an infinite disgrace, given the educational standards of the population of this state!

Mochovce Safety Regulations Assessed as 'Adequate'

AU0702150795 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 4 Feb 95 p 3

[TA SR report: "Americans Offer Assistance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mochovce—The United States has offered to expand its assistance in upgrading the safety of nuclear power plants that operate Russian-made VVER [water-cooled water-moderated energy reactor]-type reactors.

This transpires from a protocol that was signed yesterday by members of a 24-member international group of experts at the end of their week-long working stay at the Mochovce nuclear power plant (EMO). Another significant result of the deliberations by one of the key groups of the Lisbon Initiative, which had been working in Mochovce since 30 January under the leadership of Robert Ashley Erwin, a leading U.S. expert on nuclear energy, was the expression of the willingness to accept as members other countries that operate VVER reactors. Current full members are the United States, Ukraine, and Russia, while Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia are collaborating observers. The group of experts also dealt with regulations and training programs concerning the elimination of possible emergency situations at the reactors. The experts carried out an inspection of the regulations that had been worked out for the conditions of EMO's operation. They described the standard of these regulations as adequate and comparable with similar safety standards in foreign nuclear power plants.

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Trade Union Official on Talks With Government

AU0702150695 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 4 Feb 95 p 17

[Interview with Janos Vago, deputy chairman of the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions, by "T.K."; place and date not given: "There Are Limits Beyond Which One Cannot Retreat"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [MAGYAR NEMZET] The government has announced that it does not see any chance of signing a social-economic agreement. What is your opinion about this?

[Vago] The Social-Economic Agreement [TGM] can no longer be signed in its original content, and I think we should evaluate the activity carried out so far. After that, the sides can express their readiness for continuous interest coordination in a final document that can be interpreted as a political declaration.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] We remember that the creation of such an agreement by October 1994 was one of the major electoral promises of the senior coalition party. Who is responsible for failing to achieve this?

[Vago] In my opinion, all three "sides." The government has never had any uniform economic policy, and the employers have always considered only their narrow economic interests. We, the employees, are guilty of wanting to grab too much, with our demands.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] What will we lose if no agreement is reached?

[Vago] In my opinion, people will lose hope, because the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] did not receive so many votes because the citizens thought they would again be able to buy their bread for 3,6 forints. The MSZP received so many votes because the people expected a predictable future, and the aforementioned agreement could have guaranteed this: Although people would live not-so-well, at least they would know what they an hope for, and when. Now, however, it turns out that the basis, or the three-year modernization program, of the government is not there and, without this, we cannot even agree on details.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] If there was mutual good will, why did the concept fail?

[Vago] The way I see it, there is no political consensus about the trade unions among the parties: namely, the idea that the trade unions represent the immune system of our society. Nor is there any concrete consensus on the legal and other conditions that create real coordination of interests. The parliamentary parties and the employees become frightened of partnership relations with us, and they have some kind of enemy image regarding the trade unions and workers councils.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] The way I see it, the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions [MSZOSZ] is also disappointed, although they have been the most optimistic so far about signing the TGM.

[Vago] I think our members and officials are disappointed. Although this government offered and carried out coordination of interests on a lot more subjects than its predecessor, these talks brought hardly any concrete results and prospects for the people.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] There are people who think that the employee side has become rigid and that this is the reason behind the failure to agree on labor law so far.

[Vago] There are limits beyond which one simply can not retreat: namely, the trade union and employee rights. I think that after the elections, the government should have used its huge legitimacy to introduce tough economic measures and, at the same time, to guarantee and increase employee rights. This would have led to a balance. I am also very sorry for the fact that the Labor Affairs Ministry does not regard the coordination of interests suggested by us as professionally manageable: namely, the system of sector framework-collective agreements.

[MAGYAR NEMZET) Why is this so important?

[Vago] There are small private ventures in Hungary employing a few workers, with no trade union and no collective agreement. However, in places with a collective agreement, the trade union official signs this agreement with the local employer, and he is subordinate to and afraid of the employer for good reason in times of economic recession. This is why a collective agreement is so important, an agreement signed by trade union officials independent of a specific employer, officials who are professionals and are not subordinated to the employers for subsistence purposes. These agreements could then be extended even to places with three employees.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] What hopes do you have of the Interest Coordination Council again discussing the labor law?

[Vago] There will be agreement only if the other two sides accept our proposals on the strategic issues that are important to us.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Do you think the protest actions planned by the MSZOSZ played a role in the government decision?

[Vago] I am convinced of it.

Viktor Orban on Coalition Prospects, Privatization

AU0802082695 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 6 Feb 95 p 2

[Interview with Viktor Orban, chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats, by Antal Andrassy; place and date not given: "Orban Says the Coalition Pact Is Weakening the Prime Minister"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] [Andrassy] What did the recent six-party negotiations convince you of?

[Orban] The debates on privatization suggest that we are again doing things upside down. The debate on the three-year economic modernization program promised by the prime minister has definite priority over the privatization law, because the latter is only a means of implementing a given social-economic program. The government is again following a bad working method; and we might easily feel ashamed again, like in the autumn of 1994 when, for lacking an economic policy program, the EU denied us a credit of 2 billion ECU.

[Andrassy] What is the opinion and position of the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] as regards privatization?

[Orban] The parliamentary parties represent two different positions today. According to one position, privatization is merely an economic issue, and if we regard it as such, we revive the "Manchester" capitalism of the 19th century. The Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] represents this position.

The other position, shared by five parties, says that moral, social, and ideological factors should also be asserted in privatization. In other words: We should create the German social market economy of the 20th century, one that facilitates the development of a Hungarian middle class and makes sure that state property does not get into the hands of a few big capitalist groups. In addition, this concept links the accumulation of property to employment and investment obligations.

[Andrassy] What is hindering this?

[Orban] The power struggle within the government, a struggle between the two coalition partners. For quite some time, they have stopped arguing about what economic policy they should conduct and have instead been arguing about each side's share of power. Irrespective of their activity, a strong prime minister was the guarantee of the stability of the Antall cabinet and the Boross cabinet. If the prime minister cannot make use of his constitutional opportunities and fulfill his public scope for maneuver because of political agreements or personal weakness, government activity is disturbed. Ministers will come and go.

[Andrassy] You are increasingly stronger advocates of the center-right civic alliance and are "flirting" with the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] with increasing openness. What motivates the FIDESZ to shift to the right?

[Orban] Just as in Europe, leftist and center-right political groups will characterize the power relations here too, sooner or later. Along with this long-term truth, however, we must also face the short-term political realities. Last year's parliamentary elections proved for us that things do not work separately. The local government elections, however, showed that things work quite well together. This is the simple and rational reason behind the civic alliance currently in formation.

[Andrassy] The opposition parties carried out a frontal attack on the Ministry of Culture and its leader, a former FIDESZ member.

[Orban] The latter has nothing to do with the criticism. I think now, however, that this cultural "war" has come to a psychological turn because for the first time in five years, an intellectual has been dismissed for allegedly having anti-Semitic views. (Jozsef Vekerdy, head of the International Exchange Department of the National Szechenyi Library) This raises a lot of questions, and in our view, the culture minister should take a public stand, because he has political responsibility. He should tell the people about the legal background and the procedure behind the decision that someone has to lose his job because of his political views. This already belongs to the category of human rights, and the protection of human rights is independent of party affiliation.

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Pawlak Replaced by Oleksy as Prime Minister

AU0702211995 Paris AFP in English 2107 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Warsaw, Feb 7 (AFP)—Beleaguered Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak's coalition partners agreed Tuesday to a proposal by Pawlak's own party that he stand down to avoid the dissolution of parliament threatened by President Lech Walesa.

The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD, ex-communists) agreed to a suggestion by Pawlak's Peasants' Party (PSL) that the speaker of the lower house, Jozef Oleksy, an SLD leader, should take over as premier on condition that a PSL member replace him as speaker, SLD head Aleksander Kwasniewski said.

Communique Issued on Ruling Coalition Meeting

LD0702192995 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1830 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Literally a second ago we received a communique from the meeting of the ruling coalition meeting.

At the meeting of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and Polish Peasant Party [PSL] coalition today, Premier Pawlak and the PSL delegation proposed three different ways out of the situation which has arisen. The first way out is to supplement the government of Waldemar Pawlak by entrusting the post of deputy premier and minister of foreign affairs to Aleksander Kwasniewski, and also to possibly include in the government other members of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] leadership. Such a solution negates the present unhealthy situation with the so-called super premier, reads the communique.

The second solution is entrusting the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers to Jozef Oleksy of the SLD, and the post of Sejm speaker to Jozef Zych of the PSL. In this variant, both party leaders, that is Kwasniewski and Pawlak, remain outside the government, which is more natural than the present state of affairs.

The third way out: The creation of a government by the SLD in coalition with other parties, for instance the Freedom Union. In this situation, the PSL will remain in opposition.

And that is all in the communique from the meeting of the coalition, which we received literally a second ago.

Democratic Left Accepts Oleksy for Premier Post

LD0702205195 Warsaw PAP in Polish 2034 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 7 Feb—Democratic Left Alliance Spokesman Zbigniew told correspondents today that "the Alliance accepts, with understanding, the proposal of the Polish Peasants' Party to appoint Jozef Oleksy chairman of the Council of Ministers."

SLD Statement on Oleksy for Prime Minister

LD0702220295 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2100 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The way of overcoming the political crisis accepted by the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] assumes that Jozef Oleksy from the SLD will be appointed prime minister, and that Jozef Zych from the Polish Peasants' Party [PSL] will become Sejm speaker. This solution was proposed by the PSL.

[Begin correspondent Przemyslaw Barbrich recording] After an hour-long meeting, the SLD leadership issued a statement for the press. The statement says:

The SLD leadership, being aware of the necessity to urgently solve the political conflict, and the need to solve economic and social problems in an active and efficient way, as well as making the coalition work more effective, accepts the proposal by the PSL to appoint Jozef Oleksy chairman of the Council of Ministers.

The SLD leadership also believes it is necessary, in forming the new PSL-SLD government, to ensure a coherent government program, as well as professionalism and proper cooperation between the coalition partners. The SLD leadership hopes that the PSL will fully share the principles of forming the new government.

This was Przemyslaw Barbrich reporting from the Council of Ministers' office. [end recording]

The change in the Cabinet is to be carried out through a vote on a constructive motion of no-confidence in the Sejm, which means a simultaneous motion of no-confidence in the present government and the appointment of a new prime minister. Jozef Oleksy has agreed to become prime minister.

Walesa: I Am Ready To Fight Against Anyone

BR0702153695 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 7 Feb 95 p 7

[Interview with Polish President Lech Walesa by Sandro Scabello in Warsaw; date not given: "Walesa Tells Deputies: Step Down"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Warsaw—*Lech Walesa wants Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak's head. He said so yesterday in no uncertain terms to the leaders of all parliamentary groups. Only if Pawlak quits will he abandon his intention to dissolve parliament and organize early elections.* [passage omitted]

"In democratic Poland two philosophies have clashed," Walesa said about the reasons behind this new conflict. "On the one hand, there are those who claim that we have to work quietly behind closed doors in ministries and

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offices and then hold elections; on the other hand, there are those like me who believe that all problems giving rise to doubts and discussion should be brought to the fore before taking a vote. If we are discussing more than ever today, even in a passionate way, it will result in fewer corrections needing to be made tomorrow to a good political system."

[Scabello] Parliament claims that you are violating the Constitution.

[Walesa] No one has ever proved this, not even the Constitutional Court. Others are violating the law.

[Scabello] Your opponents accuse you of trying to destabilize Poland in order to be able to present yourself as the ministering angel in the year of the presidential elections.

[Walesa] It is inevitable that you create a certain degree of destabilization when you are building up a democratic system from the ashes of communism. However, those who intend to live surrounded by a cemetery-like quietness are also a destabilizing factor. I do not destroy for the pleasure of destroying, but rather as a stimulus.

[Scabello] According to your former adviser, Bronislaw Geremek, Walesa constitutes a threat to democracy.

[Walesa] Yes, to the kind of graveyard democracy which rejoices in doing nothing wreathed with laurels. I try to improve myself and this does not please those who adore cemetery peace.

[Scabello] To what extent has the leftist government slowed down economic reform?

[Walesa] We have initiated reforms in an austere manner. This government has put its foot on the brake. Is that right? We all agree on the goals to be achieved: market access, pluralism, democracy. Differences exist, however, on time schedules. The Solidarity governments supported a quick conversion to a market economy at a forced rate. The leftist coalition advocates a more moderate and gradual approach. I share the Solidarity strategy: I prefer to suffer more, but for a shorter period of time.

[Scabello] Your popularity has dropped to a historic minimum. How do you intend to catch up?

[Walesa] We will see at the elections. Once in a while a new name shows up, but he disappears immediately. No one would be able to resist for as long as I have. I have no desire at all to be reelected, I know better ways to spend my time, but I still want to do something for Poland. The challengers are approaching, I am ready to fight against anyone.

Oleksy Prime Ministership Not Opposed by Walesa

LD0802123695 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1205 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 8 Feb—The president raises no objections to the candidacy of Speaker Oleksy, PAP was told on Wednesday by presidential spokesman Leszek Spalinski. He added that Lech Walesa has spoken on the telephone with Jozef Oleksy and presented his stance on this issue. It is appropriate to expect an expeditious meeting between the president and the speaker.

"We acknowledge the evaluation put forward on the radio this morning by Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] leader Aleksander Kwasniewski on the subject of cooperation with the president regarding the filling of particular ministerial posts as interesting and as going in the right direction," the spokesman stressed. He added that the president is awaiting the procedural steps associated with a change of government.

SLD Leader, Kolodko on Future of Government

LD0702193295 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1830 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Aleksander Kwasniewski, leader of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], has said that if in the course of the meeting today with the Polish Peasant Party firm decisions are not taken on the issue of the reconstruction of the government, then the SLD may leave the ruling coalition.

[Unidentified reporter] Firm opinions regarding changes in the government were also expressed today by Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko, who is formally not associated with the SLD.

[Begin Kolodko recording] I feel that as matters have now gone so far, and the noose is now so close that the rope is around the neck, this government must be reconstructed.

[Reporter] SLD politicians expect firm decisions in the course of the meeting today.

[Begin recording] [Kwasniewski] I am aware of what will happen, and I know very well. I think that my colleagues from the SLD leadership also know well what will happen if firm and clear decisions are not taken at this stage.

[Unidentified reporter] The SLD will leave the coalition?

[Unidentified reporter] Did you nod your head?

[Kwasniewski] I did not nod anything, I did not nod anything. Only, if you are observing this process, then of course such a situation is possible. [end recording]

[Reporter] The leader of the SLD declares that the growing crisis in the coalition cannot be dealt with by cosmetic changes in the government. If someone thinks that an exit from the present situation is possible through the use of powder or perfumes, Aleksander Kwasniewski said today, then I fear that the consequences may turn out to be far more reaching.

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Kwasniewski Sees Possible Solution to Crisis

LD0802100195 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0826 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 8 Feb—Aleksander Kwasniewski, leader of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], told the "Signals of the Day" program on Wednesday morning that he is very satisfied that it is possible to find a solution to the political crisis. He revealed that it was he who on Tuesday evening put the most pressure on Sejm Speaker Oleksy to convince him to undertake the mission of forming a government. He added that the new government should be programmatically cohesive, professional, and have a high ethical standard. He did not rule out that some of the people who have been ministers up to now will be in it, from the SLD and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], and also figures of the stature of Andrzej Milczanowski.

Kwasniewski expressed respect for the stance of the PSL and SLD representatives who on Tuesday decided to create a new government. "I am thinking of the prime minister who resigned," he said, "and this is never easy. I am thinking of Speaker Oleksy, who has undertaken the effort, although he himself has many doubts, but he listened to our reasoning and arguments. I must say of my colleagues from the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SDRP], and immodestly of myself, that we have proved for the umpteenth time that we are not concerned with sinecures and our own selves, but with matters moving forward."

In Kwasniewski's view, "opportunities are opening up for the creation of a government that is more effective, more efficient." The SLD leader added that the talks which are commencing on this subject will surely not be easy. "We want this government to be programmatically cohesive, that it be entered by people who are professionally prepared, with a high ethical standard, not involved with any ambiguous interests, or else situations that are doubtful from the legal point of view." In Kwasniewski's opinion, some of the ministers hitherto have proved themselves, and they should continue to fill their posts. "I think," Kwasniewski stressed, "that it is necessary to address with respect the present minister of internal affairs, Andrzej Milczanowski, who belongs to the distinguished ministers in the government of Waldemar Pawlak, and in previous ones, more, to the examples of state public service that should oblige in Poland in the future."

Kwasniewski stressed that talks must take place between the candidate for prime minister and the president as to potential candidates for the heads of the "presidential" ministries. He added that in order to stabilize the situation in Poland, the opinion of the president on the filling of these posts, required by the constitution, should not be understood in merely formal terms, but that this should be an accord. "However," he noted, "this depends on the will of the president, whether he will wish to look at this more widely, or else carry on a unique political game with the government and the new prime minister."

Speaking of the tasks of the new government, Kwasniewski listed the maintenance of economic growth, reform of the system of social welfare policy, the creation of the structures that are indispensable for undertaking effective negotiations with the EU, and also the reform of the economic center. In the view of the SLD leader, a condition for the implementation of these aims is "the signing of the budget by the president and an end to the entanglement of the economy in matters of politics."

Walesa Views Domestic Politics, Russia, NATO

AU0802120295 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 4 Feb 95 p 6

[Exclusive interview with Polish President Lech Walesa by Erol Rizaov and Zoran Andonovski; place and date not given: "We Paid an Enormous Price for the Reforms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Poland is now going through a particular phase of its postcommunist life. The left-wing government has not abandoned the foundations that were put in place by the cabinet of Hanna Suchocka and it is continuing with the economic reforms successfully. You, as a part of the other end of the political spectrum and with a special position in the Polish Constitution, do not always agree with the activities of Waldemar Pawlak's government. What are the actual characteristics of Poland today?

[Walesa] Let me start by recalling something. Five years ago, after the victory of democracy, Poland chose its development road in a sovereign way: The market economy and pro-Western option in international policy that, in our opinion, will culminate in full participation in the economic structures and security in the West. We have been following this direction consistently for more than five years. We have made achievements, but we have also had little time for these processes. The economic changes have reinforced the currency, they have stopped inflation, and they have increased the gross national product. The present left-wing government must observe these achievements. It also knows that there is no other road. There is no return to a socialist economy. I cannot agree with it. We must also be honest with the West, which is carefully monitoring our reforms, on which depend the good cooperation and achievements of our aspirations for entering the European Union and other structures.

I would also like to underline that it is normal that the West should see some things differently to the way we see them here on the spot. Although it says otherwise in its declarations, the present coalition has stopped the reforms in the past year. There is a wish to return to a central directed economy and for a withdrawal from the present line. I, as a president who has been elected in democratic elections and a president with another political option, must observe this and react within the framework of the law.

Generally speaking, on this question, the present coalition must not count on returning to the old system, but,

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unfortunately, some of its activities can halt or destroy what has been achieved through great endeavor in the economic and political fields in the last years. Because, so to say, according to some legal relations that are being proposed, the state must distribute, command, manage, and be present even in places in which it has no reason to be. The development of self-management has been stopped. All this is contrary to the principles of the market economy and civil society.

I shall also add that this does not mean that I am in favor of a completely free Americanization of the market, of 19th Century capitalism: Bloodthirsty and resolutely against the weakest. We must be aware that skill and competition were wiped from the market during socialism, a society in which independence in decision-making and initiative did not exist. Socialism distributed poverty equally. The state decided what was good and what was bad for the citizens. They were poor, but sure in the equality of the poverty. Years will have to pass before a new mentality that will teach the people to function in different conditions is created.

Partners With the West

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] The great rise of industrial production has affirmed Poland's possibilities in Europe since the beginning of the year. Do you think that it is necessary to continue on this road or should the policy of transformation that is being implemented by the left-wing government be changed?

[Walesa] I have partly replied to your question. However, I would like to underline very strongly that the present economic rise is a result of the several years of "Solidarity" governments' policy that is actually being continued by the present team, although, as I said, now with a delay. I underline this because the present coalition is happy to show off its successes and boast that it alone deserves the credit. As if there the previous five years had never existed.

As far as our organizational links with Western Europe are concerned, we do not think that it is a question of whether we shall enter the European Union or not. We have already fulfilled many of the conditions that are usually asked of a candidate. Moreover, Europe must realize that support for market changes in Eastern Europe is to its benefit, too. Our final success will greatly depend on our level of cooperation with the West.

Regarding the question from the aspect of making an assessment of the present governmental team, I stated my views earlier: I am worried about the attempts for a return to the methods of the old system.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] In your opinion, what was the reason for the failure of what can be called a moderate right wing at last year's elections, and even the failure of your Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR]? Why did the voters go back to the left?

[Walesa] I shall begin with the prefix. The BBWR, I would say, was not formed by me, although it appeared following my appeal. I was aware, even at that time, that it could lead to a large division within the right-wing parties, which were divided into a dozen parties and smaller parties. It was not a powerful movement of "Solidarity" any more, united in a struggle against the common enemy. There were divisions, and that is natural, with different platforms: The relationship toward the past, the Church, the economy, and so on. Before the parliamentary elections, it became apparent that malice and party disputes divided the old colleagues. The electoral law made major requests to the parties. I could see what was going on. I appealed to the right-wing parties to be reasonable and to unite before the elections. They would not listen to me. In the meantime, the left-wing parties started the elections in a large bloc and won.

Let us return to the BBWR. The quarreling right-wing parties did not listen to me, but there was a group of people who accepted the idea of a nonparty bloc with a right-wing oriented program. This is how the BBWR was formed, and how it got so many votes in such a short time. Unfortunately, the number of the votes was not enough for it to enter parliament.

You are asking me why the electors gave their votes to the left- wing bloc. First, as I said, the right-wing bloc was destroyed and the right-wing electorate—which was not a small at all, it was 20 percent in the elections—was unfortunately divided into many parties. Second, our society paid a high price for the difficult, but indispensable market reforms. There was unemployment, unprofitable companies went bankrupt, the state stopped providing support to people that were used to getting it. It was necessary to learn how to take things into one's own hands and how to govern one's own destiny. Many weaker social groups felt imperiled. People began to be afraid of the next day. Among everything, this was another reason for mourning the former state's care, which was not providing a great life, but that would not let people die. Moreover, the achievements of democracy and the free market that we made and that we could only dream about a few years ago became worn out and mundane. We forgot that we bought sugar, meat, and even shoes for coupons a few years ago. We forgot that we dreamt about freedom of speech and travelling to the West. It has become normal today.

However, I am aware that although the reforms were so difficult, they could have cost the people less. We were the first on this road, and we could not avoid the mistakes that we are aware of today. There is still time for some corrections, although it is not easy. Poland is still not a rich country, but I know one thing: The weakest groups, those that cannot or do not know how to adapt themselves to the new reality, should not be left on their own. For a long time, I have been taking care for the liberation of the whole society. The people must become aware that the reforms will create profit. It is not true that only a small group makes the profit.

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The Church Does Not Have "Its Own" Parties

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] The Church and "Solidarity" experienced a true debacle at the last elections, particularly the Church, because not a single candidate of the right-wing parties that discretely supported the Church entered parliament. Why did the magic of the two key powers that headed the struggle against the Communist Party disappear in only four years?

[Walesa] This question confirms that you do not understand the Polish realities as regards the role and the position of the Catholic Church in our country. How can we talk about the disappearance from the scene of an institution that has persisted in maintaining its moral authority for hundreds of years by bolstering the national identity and the spirit of the nation? I need not talk about the role of the Church during communism. We know the role of the Polish pope who awoke our hope and strength in the struggle for dignity, for our own rights.

You have mixed up a lot of things. It is true that the right parties had similar outlooks to the Church in their programs. However, it does not mean that the Church was on the side of a particular party in the elections. The Church in Poland is not engaged actively in policy, it does not make "its own" parties. Of course, it does not hide its preferences in the moral sphere, but it also does not make any political declarations. The fact that some priests are engaged in the campaign as citizens does not define the stance of the Church.

I have already said why the right-wing parties lost the elections and the Church does not have anything to do with it. Its position is not a problem. More than 90 percent of Poles are Catholics. The authority of the Church in Poland has remained on an equally high level.

You are also talking about "Solidarity." It is definite that one of the reasons for the defeat in the elections was because this movement is still searching for its identity, that is, whether to form a broad professional alliance or a political party. The internal discussions, the divisions, the high price for the reforms that it covered for a long time—were not in its favor. I am sure that it will have success in the next elections. This is confirmed by many assumptions. The trade union has drawn conclusions from previous defaults. The political card becomes all the more important. The current "Solidarity" is not the one of 1981. The powerful social movement at that time gathered 10 million Poles that believed in the victory of the struggle that they had started for their dignity, for the right to independent trade unions, for sovereignty, and for subjectivity.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Next year, there should be presidential elections in Poland, and a new constitution will probably be passed. You have announced that you are counting on a new five-year mandate and on a constitution that will define the political system in the country as presidential. Do you think, contrary to the efforts of the present parliamentary majority for a different system, that this is the best solution for Poland?

[Walesa] Poland is at a turning point now. This is the time of building new structures; a new political and economic system. We have become a democratic country. The last years have shown that at a time of historical transition, when there are old and new laws and when we study democracy very hard to compensate for its absence from our lives for so many years, various hurdles appear. Do frequently have we observed the paralysis of authority and the slowliness of the constitutional and executive power. I am sure that, at this time of transition, at this time of the formation of our whole system, there must be an exact and efficient executive power with clearly defined responsibilities. It has nothing to do with any restrictions in democracy. I am attached to the French system, and I do not think that anyone can say that democracy is endangered there. Let us not talk about the presidential system in the United States. That is why the projected law must lead to a presidential system. It has nothing to do with me personally, because the Constitution will have to be prepared over many years.

NATO Is Not Only in Our Interests

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Can the "Partnership for Peace" project solve the problem of the security vacuum that has existed in Central Europe since the fall of the Iron Curtain?

[Walesa] It is a step forward in the right direction, but in our opinion, it is too cautious. Our goal is to participate fully in NATO. There cannot be a region of insecurity in the center of Europe. Our participation in NATO is not only in our interests. It is also in the interests of Europe. In the past, others decided about our alliances. Today, we are sovereign, and we define our own orientation. Poland has always been oriented toward the West. We are a part of Europe, and we want to be present in many structures in Europe. Because of a lack of strategic thinking, the opinion has emerged that if our countries are accepted into the structures of the continent, then they will be weakened and new threats will emerge. The opposite will occur. As a final result, they will be reinforced and, at the same time, a new phase of integration will begin. I also want to say clearly that our efforts toward joining NATO are not directed against anyone. The perception that it will be dangerous if NATO is expanded confirms the attachment to the idea of two hostile blocs. If we do not overcome this, there will always be the question of spheres of influence. As a consequence of that, the system of confrontations will remain. That is why the Alliance is a partnership institution and we want to have a partnership in NATO.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] How is the role of Russia understood in Warsaw now? During his visit to Warsaw, Boris Yeltsin said that Poland can look for its security road without the tutorship of the Kremlin, but he countered his words with some actions. What is the relationship between Poland and Russia? Can Warsaw trust

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Moscow, and what does it mean for your country to be the only country in Central Europe that borders Russia?

[Walesa] It is true that, in Warsaw, President Boris Yeltsin comitted himself and Russia to not obstructing our aspirations to join NATO. After that, the tone was changed. I want to add that I emphasized our decisions in my speech at the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe summit that was held in Budapest. Today, we are a sovereign country, and we have the right to make our own decisions. We do not want new divisions in Europe, but no country can prevent our aspirations. Nobody wants to isolate Russia, and our aspirations are certainly not against its interests. We see Russia as a partner, and we expect it to act as a partner. I believe that Russia does not want to be understood as a successor of the USSR and of the Warsaw Pact and that it will stop considering NATO to be an opposing structure. I am happy to accept the stance of the West in reference to the admission of new members, and that will be a decision of an independent determination and not of foreign pressure.

As far as relations between Poland and Russia are concerned, they are defined in the agreement that we signed with Yeltsin in 1992. There are also the international agreements. The economic cooperation with Russia is important for us. It is a big market. We want to develop good, harmonious relations to the benefit of both sides—on the principle of partnership, of course. There are still burdens in our contacts that are in closely connected to our past. We succeeded in overcoming many stereotypes, we have explained others, but let me here mention the question of the Katyn Woods that has become a measure of honesty in Polish-Russian relations. However, there is plenty of time for constructing our mutual relations in a new spirit.

We need each other. I think that the pragmatic opinion about our better future must prevail. It will be for the benefit of Poland and Russia.

Unanimous Strategic Questions

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Poland is the strongest advocate of a stronger structure in the Visegrad Group. Membership of the most ellite European club, the European Union, is the most desired economic and political structure for all postcommunist countries. Which road leads to Brussels? Can Poland go it alone or would it be better to go along with the other countries of the Visegrad Group?

[Walesa] Since the formation of the Visegrad Group, Poland has believed that we should discuss strategic questions together and enter jointly into the dialogue with the European Union and NATO. This could be our trump card in the process of integration into these institutions.

The role of the Visegrad Group today differs from its role in the initial phase. The Visegrad Group was born into a particular political situation. It was a regional structure that responded to the needs of the countries that joined it. The aim of its formation was the political transformation of the larger countries in the region, exit from the Warsaw Pact and the Alliance, and support for mutual economic cooperation. It is sure that the Group helped these processes. Today, we have another time, the realities have been changed. It does not mean that we do not want to cooperate any more.

Today, we concentrate our attention on the destruction of the barriers among the countries of the CEFTA in the field of economy, and we also consult about the most important political questions.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Polish-Macedonian relations have a long history of cordiality and friendship. They have not changed substantially after the fall of the communist regime. How do you assess them today?

[Walesa] Since the fall of the previous regime, cooperation with many countries that have traditionally been connected to us economically and politically has weakened. That is understandable. Today, we are looking for new ways of mutual cooperation. When, more than five years ago, we chose the Western option, aspiring to the European economic structure, we were forced to focus ourselves, first of all, on this line. It does not mean that we do not accept and recognize mutual contacts. We have signed numerous agreements that define the legal frameworks of this cooperation. I think that we shall intensify relations with your country, too. The economic, the political, and the cultural. It is to the benefit of every country.

POLITYKA Views Chechnya, German Response

95EP0037A Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
6 Jan 95 p 8

[Article by Adam Krzeminski, commentator for the Warsaw weekly POLITYKA: "Poles Are Again Fearful"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Text] Although the Russian invasion of Chechnya is legally an "internal Russian affair," said Polish Foreign Minister Andrej Olechowski on television, the manner in which Russia tackles internal problems is a reason for greatest concern for Poles.

His predecessor in the office, international law professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski, precisely defined the legal misgivings about the rubber formula of "internal affairs": "Does Chechnya's staying within the borders of Russia mean that Russia has full freedom of action vis-a-vis Chechnya? No, it does not have this freedom, nor can the whole problem be reduced to a simple reference to Russian sovereignty..."

Professor Skubiszewski pointed out the duties which result for Russia from international law, even if a people's right to self-determination—as in the case of the Chechens—does not lead to international recognition of its state. No state has a completely free hand in dealing with its citizens; every state is bound by the precepts of human rights. It is in the interest of the international community that there be a

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democratic and constitutional Russia which "rejects neomperialistic, hegemonic and nationalistic ideas. Europe's East must not be a source of anarchism and destabilization. Therefrom results the necessity of international support for a policy pursuing these goals." Hence, brutal measures must not be sanctioned.

Polish commentators and correspondents in Russia do not have the inner calm of jurists and politicians; they speak out more emotionally and above all employ historical analogies. Especially as, since the 18th century, Russia's imperial drive to the South went hand in hand with the drive to the West and—precisely 200 years ago—led to the third partition of Poland. Since then, write some commentators, a curious community of fate links the Caucasian mountain tribes to the Poles: Whenever the Czarist army was occupied in the West, the Caucasians had a breathing spell, and vice versa: Whenever Russia was entangled in battles on its southern flank—as most recently in Afghanistan—the Poles had the chance to exert themselves more strongly for their own emancipation.

It may be understandable that Polish reports from Grozny are often underpinned historically. GAZETA WYBORCZA headlined its title story with the words of Czar Alexander II to the Poles in 1956: "Point de reveries, Messieurs!" ("No more dreaming, gentlemen!") They also like to recall that Yeltsin pursues the same strategy as Stalin in 1944 in Poland, by trying to install a regime in Grozny acceptable to him.

History overshadows the present events. On New Year's day, the daily newspaper RZECZPOSPOLITA published memoirs of a Polish officer who fought in 1918 on the side of the Chechens. And its Bonn correspondent commented bitingly that the German foreign minister "deigned, at Christmas of all times, to utter in a most Christian manner understanding for the bombing of the civilian population in Grozny. Oh well, Russia, Russia above all..."

Historical analogies are one thing, current analyses and prognoses are something else. Despite outrage over the relapse of the "war party" in Moscow into imperial hubris, despite Yeltsin's inability to solve by peaceful means the internal quarrels of the gigantic country, Poland's most farsighted obervers, such as Ryszard Kapuscinski or Adam Michnick, see the Chechnya conflict in a broader context: as a prelude to a large-scale conflict of Russia with Islam, which it cannot win in any way by brute force. At the same time, they see the conflict as the onset of a new test of strength between Russian democrats who disapprove of the war in the Caucasus but have lost all influence over the power elite in Moscow, and the "war party" to which Yeltsin has now moved closer and which acts practically according to Zhirinovsky's program.

For Poles, this means a resurrection of old specters, so that they look even more determinedly to the protective umbrella of NATO on the one hand, and support the weakened Russian democrats, on the other. "The war against Chechnya is a dangerous and irresponsible adventure," wrote Adam Michnik, thereby reflecting the mood in Poland: "This war does not ensure the integrity of Russia. Rather, it can initiate a disintegration of the Russian state. Yeltsin must know: Everyone in Poland, from the Right to the Left, including the sincere friends of the Russian people and Russian democracy, is against this adventuresome punitive expedition. From this day on, Poles will again be fearful of Russia."

Poll: UW, SLD Most Likely To Reenter Sejm

WS0702135895 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 7 Feb 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "DEMOSKOP: Which Parties Stand a Chance of Entering Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the most recent poll conducted by Demoskop, the Freedom Union [UW] and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] would gather the largest number of votes in parliamentary elections. If elections to the Sejm were held in January, 22 percent of the people would vote for each of these parties. The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] would have the support of 17 percent.

The Union of Labor [UP] and Solidarity would not have any problems entering parliament—each has the support of 9 percent of potential voters. It is not certain whether the required minimum of votes would be obtained by the Covenant for Poland [PdP] (5 percent), the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR] (before Religa left to form a republican party, 5 percent of those polled claimed they would vote for BBWR), the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] (5 percent), and the Union for Real Politics [UPR] (4 percent).

Two thirds of those polled declared their willingness to vote. One fifth within this group did not know which party they would support.

Which party would you vote for if elections to the Sejm were held next week?

	Percent
UW	22
SLD	22
UP	9
Solidarity	9
PdP	5
KPN	5
BBWR	5
UPR	4
Other	2

* * *

The poll was carried out by Demoskop between 12 and 17 January on a group of 946 Poles.

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Military Poll Shows Distrust for Walesa in Army

WS0702153395 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 7 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Pawel Wronski: "Military Sociologists' Research: The Army About the President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Politicians generally believe that the Army has a huge trust in Lech Walesa. The majority of professional officers within the Polish Army, however, are critical of him, although they declare it is a soldier's duty to be loyal to the president.*

Walesa is the commander in chief of the Polish Armed Forces. The highest commanding officers lent him their support during the vote to dismiss Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk in Drawsko last September. The generals are not the whole Army, however.

The Military Institute of Sociological Research at the Academy of National Defense polled the political views of professional officers of the Polish Army twice last year. In a poll conducted last summer, 28 percent of the respondents supported President Walesa. As much as 66 percent claimed that he has a negative influence on the developments in our country.

In the same poll, 65 percent supported Waldemar Pawlak's government. The Sejm had the support of 66 percent.

The poll was conducted at a time when the Belvedere had already launched a propagandistic offensive on military units. Lech Walesa participated in swearing in ceremonies, officer nominations, ceremonies conferring banners to military units. He repeatedly said that the Army should believe him, a corporal, rather than politicians who had nothing to do with the Army.

The Institute's questionnaire never reached the Vistula Military Units which are subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In a poll conducted last fall, the soldiers were asked to indicate their sympathies and level of support for specific parties on a scale of minus one to plus one.

The average support for the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic was plus 0.85 percent (the maximum was plus one). Trust for the Freedom Union was plus 0.71 percent, and for the Polish Peasant Party it was plus 0.64 percent. The rightist parties were severely defeated. Support for the Christian National Union was minus 0.92 percent, and for the Confederation for an Independent Poland—minus 0.55 percent.

The majority of research carried out by the Institute is classified material, but both the president and the generals are well acquainted with their results.

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Iliescu Responds to Funar Open Letter

AU0702165295 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the open letter to Romania's president from PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] President Gheorghe Funar, our editorial office has received a statement from the spokesman for the presidency. The statement says that the Romanian president's entire activity reveals his openness to dialogue with the country's citizens, political figures, parties, parliament, and other institutions of a rule-of-law state.

In the Romanian president's view, political dialogue is an essential condition for ensuring that the process of transformation of the country and its fundamental institutions takes the path that is shortest and most beneficial for all citizens.

The statement further reads: To fulfill its function, this form of political communication must fulfill the conditions of goodwill. It must seek to identify the real problems and the substance of positions and solutions. Last but not least, there must be a minimum level of decorum in the language used and the attitude exhibited toward one's opponents.

At the same time, the presidency spokesman assesses that Mr. Funar's latest open letter to Romania's president hardly meets these minimum requirements. The letter attempts to establish a false dialogue in which there is very little interest in communication and a great deal of interest in promoting Funar's own image in the media.

Further, where Mr. Funar's letter addresses important aspects for society and the political debate in Romania, the statement contains other points regarding the Romanian president's position.

Minority Leaders Emphasize Loyalty to State

AU0802083295 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 7 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] held a colloquy at UDMR headquarters tonight in connection with the autonomy concept and the Romanian Government's statements on this subject. The discussions, which began at 1700 and lasted until 2030, were attended by representatives of the other minorities in our country and Ivan Truta, executive secretary of the Council for National Minorities. Our correspondent Mihai Cutus told us that Gyorgy Tokay, UDMR vice president and leader of the UDMR parliamentary group, presented several UDMR views on the subject under discussion. The floor was then taken by the representatives of the other minorities, who emphasized the importance of observing the country's Constitution and of loyally cooperating with the Romanian state, whose citizens they are. Similarly, the representatives of the other minorities asked the UDMR representatives to resume their place on the Council for National Minorities.

Government Parties Meet To Examine Party Dispute

AU0702210595 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting of the parties belonging to the governmental alliance, signatories of the protocol on political understanding, began this evening, at 1830 hours. In addition to the leaderships of the four parties concerned—Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], Greater Romania Party [PRM], and Socialist Party of Labor [PSM]—the meeting was also attended by certain members of the executive.

At a news conference today in Bucharest, Vice President Ioan Solcanu said that the PDSR, the initiator of this meeting, is not so much interested in a clarification of the situation with Gheorghe Funar as it is with the leadership of the PUNR. What the PDSR particularly wants to know is whether the PUNR leadership backs the actions of its president. Similarly, the PDSR wants to know the position of other parties of the governmental alliance, the PRM and PSM. With this is mind, the PDSR will define its position toward the PUNR and examine the possible implications for the implementation of the political protocol signed by the four parties.

According to our correspondent, Tudor Stanciu, the meeting is still in progress behind closed doors.

PD Leader on PDSR Link to Other Parties

AU0702132195 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 2 Feb 95 p 5

[Interview with Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party, by Liana Sega; place and date not given: "The Social Democracy Party of Romania Is in the Wake of the Romanian National Unity Party, the Greater Romania Party, and the Socialist Party of Labor"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Sega] Let us talk about Romania's domestic problems. Can you add anything to your statements to date on the split in the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM]?

[Roman] The split is beginning to be perceived as a principled and doctrinary one. If this is the case, then the split is salutary. However, the situation is not yet clear. There are still ambiguities about the meaning of certain values of the past, particularly regarding their mixture of "privatization and socialism." The [Tudor] Mohora group says it is interested in becoming a movement capable of joining the Socialist International. But the Socialist International has experienced a very serious evolution with the passage of time. To put it briefly, social democracy today means blending the social aspect with the efficiency of the market economy. The issue can be discussed extensively, but this group appears to belong to the reforming Communist left. None of the

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statements made by the "Mohora group" allow us to infer anything different. However, we expect them to come up, as promised, with a minimal doctrinary platform, without which their party risks becoming, like many others, a mere vehicle for personal ambitions. I hope this will not be the case.

[Sega] How do you view Corneliu Coposu's proposal for a "great coalition for reform"?

[Roman] It is an idea that we reiterated scores of times, without much response until now. Faced with the almost incredible aggressiveness of the "red quartet"—that is, of the four convergent political trends devolving from the old regime—the other opposition parties seem to have realized the importance of this older idea of ours. It would have been better if this idea had been backed with greater strength and determination at the time. Then, we would have probably been able to prevent the ugly coalition that is sending us back to pre-December-1989 times, as far as the political situation in Romania is concerned.

[Sega] The Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] is officially engaged in an election campaign. The Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] and President Ion Iliescu are also in the full swing of the election campaign, albeit unofficially. What are the Democratic Party's [PD] plans in this respect?

[Roman] We are doing what we have done so far and even more. Namely, we are increasing our presence in the country in the most diverse forms, and we intend to go about it in a professional way by taking into consideration the real popular perception of living conditions and of those guilty who are for the current hardships. I have two things in mind: First, the people's realization that they lived incomparably better under the Petre Roman government and that there was hope in those days; second, to turn a whole program and doctrine—regarding our thoughts on reform—into a simple message for everybody to understand. I do not know whether you can call that an election campaign. I do not think so, since an election campaign presupposes direct accusations and turning this message into an appeal. We are, rather, in a preparatory phase for the election campaign.

[Sega] Would you please comment on the term "red quartet"?

[Roman] [passage omitted] Many of the people in these parties look back with nostalgia to Ceausescu's time. [passage omitted] Therefore, the "red quartet" is the outcome of this affinity—which, from the political viewpoint of its practical communist mentality, means to monopolize power and cling to it at all costs. Indeed, this is their practical affinity, beyond the affinity of mentalities.

[Sega] What might be the short- and medium-term consequences (since we may no longer have the opportunity of talking about the "red quartet" in the long run) of their political gesture?

[Roman] In the short run, the danger is that the reform, already blocked, risks increasingly becoming a mere facade, without anything substantial behind it. It could also lead to a break in Romania's movement toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration. In my opinion, this could be an extremely damaging consequence for all of us and for the country as a whole. I hope that this will give the people a better understanding, one closer to reality, of the true meaning of the PDSR.

It is not the PDSR that brought the PUNR, the Greater Romania Party [PRM], and the PSM into its wake, but rather the other way round. Through this alliance, the PDSR is now in the wake of these parties from a doctrinary, ideological, practical, and political viewpoint. The fact that some of the illustrious officials of the Vacaroiu cabinet declare themselves to be PDSR members means nothing. They are actually representatives of the Ceausescu regime, because they have nothing in common with what the PDSR claims to represent. Hence, they also reflect what I have just said: namely, that the PDSR is in the wake of the PUNR, the PRM, and the PSM.

The point is to bring this concrete truth to the public at large. The dissemination of this truth is our task. [passage omitted]

[Sega] As we know, in recent days, we have witnessed the reemergence of several problems capable of exciting the extremists from all nationalist camps. Who stands to profit from the reiteration of these positions?

[Roman] In my opinion, the extremist forces stand to gain from such a thing. The nationalist issue has always been a "bridgehead" in times of hardship. Another enemy, other than the poverty generated "by their own hands"—I am referring to the present government and the political power—and therefore, another struggle than that for well-being are political themes that may find an audience, with certain people.

I think the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] has made a profound mistake by launching this subject now, in a pretty confused manner, on top of everything. Maybe the UDMR itself is marked by a certain amount of confusion. I do not see what the UDMR as a political force stands to gain from all this. It is true that certain extremist trends within the UDMR will profit from it all, as well as the nationalist forces at home, which have now acquired something to "chew on." It does not matter that they are chewing on infested food. The main thing is that they have something to chew on.

[Sega] Maybe it's like in billiards: The UDMR extremists have hit a ball, namely the Romanian extremists, who, in their turn, are hitting another ball, namely the UDMR moderates, who...

[Roman] Everybody knows that the extremes reach each other in the end. Maybe it is still premature to say that,

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at this time. Anyhow, I see that this subject has come at a most inconvenient time for the problems Romania is facing today.

[Sega] In view of the fact that the government controls a certain not-at-all-negligible part of the mass media, as well as the important state structures—while the other structures, including the civic society, are still at a "budding" stage—how does the PD see the possibility of a change in the balance of power, in the light of the 1996 elections?

[Roman] I would like to say that any negative political phenomenon, particularly the serious situation you have just described, can only be resolved through political combativeness. Let us increase the ranks of those who fight against such negative phenomenons. I do not think there is any other way. I do not believe in miraculous solutions. Some people think in terms of all kinds of maneuvers behind the scenes. I do not believe in that. The only thing that truly counts is the commitment, determination, and combativity of the forces that believe in the justice of their cause—not in the Communist, but in the democratic, meaning of the word. If it is right to have liberty and freedom of speech, and if freedom of speech depends on the mass media, then the manipulation of the mass media is unacceptable. [passage omitted]

[Sega] In February, the three-month term of the PD Steering Collegium expires. What changes are going to take place in the leadership of your party?

[Roman] "Changes" is not necessarily the right word. It would be better to ask about what is happening there. We must present the Steering Collegium with a formula that obviously also takes into consideration the results of the elections for the previous Steering Collegium. This formula should be reached in consensus with local organizations and the leading bodies, something it is quite possible to accomplish. [passage omitted]

PUNR Regrets Tension Brought About by UDMR

AU0702173195 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On behalf of the bureau of the National Council of the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], a declaration has been faxed to our editorial office. The declaration states that the Permanent Bureau met yesterday to examine their position regarding the repeated actions by the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] violating constitutional order in Romania.

In its declaration, the PUNR Permanent Bureau expresses its regret that the UDMR's destabilizing actions have led to tension in the relations between the PUNR and the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], and it also regrets that certain prominent political leaders of the parties included in the government arch have allowed themselves to be dragged into this destabilizing political game.

In the declaration, the PUNR Permanent Bureau advocates the need to instate a real spirit of cooperation and understanding among the parties that signed the bilateral protocol and the four-party protocol, and expresses its willingness to work for real cooperation with Romania's Presidency.

In this respect, however, the declaration states, quote, we demand the Constitutional determination and authority that are necessary in the concrete actions that the PDSR leadership and the Presidency have to take for the observance and application of the laws of the Romanian state and international and European accepted standards regarding the protection of minorities, unquote.

In conclusion, the PUNR Permanent Bureau expresses its belief that there is in fact no essential difference between the political positions adopted by the PDSR and the PUNR as regards the unconstitutional manifestations of the UDMR, and notes that the problems connected with the public expression of personal viewpoints will be the subject of bilateral negotiations to be held between the two ruling parties.

'Serious' Harghita County Cases To Be Examined

AU0702204795 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 7 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have received the following faxed communique from the Romanian Government:

In view of the recent statement by Santa Pal Vilmos, president of the Harghita County Council, and the ceremony organized in Odorheiul Secuiesc on 5 February 1995 in violation of certain legal provisions, the government has set up a commission of enquiry to examine the two serious cases noted in Harghita County. The commission shall operatively forward its conclusions and impending recommendations to the government, in keeping with the provisions of the Constitution, Law No. 69/1991 on local public administration, and Law No. 75/1994 on flying Romania's flag, singing the national anthem, and the using of signs with Romania's emblem by public authorities and institutions, the communique reads.

Resita Trade Union Planning New Strikes

AU0702191395 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 28 Jan 95 p 9

[Article by Ion Medola: "State of Conflict Increasing in Resita—The Prime Minister's Promises Are Only Empty Words"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As we informed our readers after the marathon demonstrations in December, the state of conflict in the largest enterprise in Resita, namely the UCM S.A. [Machine Building Enterprise] instead of settling down, continues with new forms of protest. The series of marches and rallies organized by the "Resita 1771" Trade Union recently, again shows that Prime

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Minister Vacaroiu made lots of promises in Resita that proved to be just empty words... Because Vacaroiu was in an awkward situation, he promised the Resita workers miracles, but only for the sake of appearances and without adequate factual support. No matter how attractive they looked in the beginning—namely: that night of 13-14 December—the true value of those promises became clear pretty quickly.... The workers still have no work, although this was their primary demand; and the administration still hems and haws, just as before, according to the same old tunes.

For instance, collective labor contract negotiations resumed this week, after being interrupted...last summer. But they reached a dead end this time also on the issue of salaries. Trade union leaders are demanding a 300,000-lei average gross salary, as listed in the concluded protocol, but the administration is offering them only an 11 percent increase, which is next to nothing—that is, about 15-16,000 lei per employee! Workers are also vehemently demanding the following: job assurance, guaranteed orders and contracts, an assured technical-material base, the continued operation of the CALNICEL [expansion unknown] platform, and the assurance of protective equipment and working materials, as stipulated in the protocol concluded with the government team! Realizing now that things were promised then, at a difficult moment, just to put an end to demonstrations, and that something different has been accomplished, the state of tension has again become topical. Hence, it has been decided that an all-trade-union type of struggle is to continue using all legal means. The "Resita 1771" trade union has already collected 2,800 signatures to start a warning strike and later proceed to a general strike. Workers are rightfully upset also by the fact that four thick files, including a list of deceptions amounting to...360 million lei (committed in this enterprise by, precisely, some of its leading members!) remain untouched. Apparently, under the protection of the Vacaroiu team, which was specifically informed of widespread theft, these acts seem to have been forgotten!

Democratic Convention of Romania on UDMR

95P20458A Bucharest Democratic Convention of Romania Communique in English 30 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Communique issued on 30 January 1995 by the Democratic Convention of Romania, CDR, concerning the UDMR]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On 30 January 1995, at its extraordinary session the Council of the Democratic Convention in Romania had a discussion on the standing of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) [UDMR] within the Convention as well as on the current political situation. It declares as follows:

1. All members of the DCR, including the DAHR, support the territorial integrity of Romania as well as the sovereignty, and the unitary character, of the Romanian state without any reservation.

2. The local administrative autonomy shall be developed in all counties on an equal footing.

3. The question of minorities shall be solved in compliance with the Declaration of Alba Iulia, 1 December 1918, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Local Self-Government signed by Romania.

4. The Council for DAHR Mayors and Local Councillors is part of the internal structure of the party, similar to the ones established by other parties in Romania, and does not affect the unity and integrity of Romania.

5. There have been certain controversies on the concepts of the national state, the autonomous communities formed on an ethnic basis, and the regional autonomy among the DAHR and other members of the DCR. On this occasion, we affirm that all questions related to ethnic relations shall be legally solved within the Parliament in full respect of the Constitution.

6. The tense political situation in Romania has been created by a Government unable to solve the real economic and political problems of the country leading Romania to international isolation, even at the military level, which can have extremely serious consequences. We call attention to the fact that this situation has been generated both by the four-party Agreement signed by the PDSR (Romanian Social Democratic Party), PUNR (Party for the National Unity of Romania), PRM (Party for Greater Romania) and PSM (Romanian Socialist Labor Party) and by the recent irresponsible declarations of some PUNR leaders, which demontrate once more the extremist and anti-national character of this political formation. The PDSR is co-responsible both for the sterile agitations and immoderate declarations of the PUNR leaders, its governing ally, since it rewards them by their inclusion in government instead of sanctioning them.

7. The DCR decided to set up a special working group for the overt analysis of the controversies among the DAHR and other members of the DCR. In the future this working group will also prevent the debate of these sensitive issues only at times of crises generated by the diversions of the government.

8. The DCR observes that little has been done for the information of the public opinion about its position on the question of minorities and other major national issues. It also proposes the elaboration of a national program for the information of the citizens on these issues.

National Council of the Democratic Convention of Romania
Emil Constantinescu
President of the DCR

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UDMR's Bela Marko on Nationality Issue

95P20442A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
14 Jan 95 p 6

[Interview with UDMR chairman Bela Marko by Constantin Pavel; place and date not given: "Probably God Had a Purpose When He Put Us Together in This Place"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [ADEVARUL] In Hungarian, as in Japanese, surnames come first. Therefore, the surname of the chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR in Romanian; RMDSZ in Hungarian] is Marko.

[Pavel] The Romanians have abandoned the one-party system. What is keeping the Hungarians from abandoning it?

[Marko] We too have abandoned it. We are not a party, with all the advantages and disadvantages which devolve from this status. I am not denying the fact that, initially, we behaved like a party, but now we have a Christian-democratic platform, two liberal platforms and a social-democratic platform. We also have two parties that are associated with our organization: a Christian-Democratic party and a Smallholders' party.

[Pavel] So this means that the UDMR is a miniparliament.

[Marko] In a certain way, it is—from the moment we said we are an organization representing an entire community. We realized that this community cannot be forced to have a single ideology. Therefore, either we accept the fact that there are a number of orientations within this mammoth organization or we have to give up the idea that there should be a single organization. The reason we say we must have a single organization is an objective one: the nationality issue. The nationality issue cannot be resolved on an ideological basis. There can be different approaches but, in essence, the solutions are identical.

[Pavel] What is the main difference between a Hungarian from Hungary and a Hungarian from Romania?

[Marko] Since they live in different countries, they are faced with different social and economic problems but there are no essential differences in regard to their national identity.

[Pavel] In an ordinary day, how much Romanian blood do you drink?

[Marko] Ha, ha, ha. I would have to give a humorous response to this question had I had not observed, sadly, that in recent years, some people unlike you might ask such a question seriously.

[Pavel] What did you like best in school: geometry or the Romanian language?

[Marko] I liked both geometry and the grammar of the Romanian language. I do not know if you know what I am talking about...

[Pavel] I understand.

[Marko] Initially, I studied for a profession...

[Pavel] Engineering, I understand.

[Marko] Yes, engineering. Therefore, I liked the grammar of the Romanian language, which has a logical structure, like geometry.

[Pavel] Against which world champion did [ethnic Hungarian] Ladislau Boloni score the winning goal for Romania?

[Marko] Alas, woe is me, I do not know. I used to be a fan, but...I have an athlete in my family. My brother was the 5,000-meter champion for Romania and the 10,000-meter Balkan champion...

[Pavel] What does your wife do when the muse comes?

[Marko] She leaves me alone to talk with the muse. But, unfortunately, in recent years, the muse has not been finding me where it has been looking for me.

[Pavel] Have they told you that you look like...?

[Marko) Lenin. Yes. Even my colleagues in parliament mentioned this.

[Pavel] I understand from [the Minister of Interior] Mr. Taracila that you had dead people sign some legislative initiatives. Are you a devotee of archeology and the exhuming of the dead?

[Marko] I will have to discuss archeology with Mr. Taracila, as well as the problems in Cluj and the way in which the Ministry of Interior intervened or failed to intervene. I have no knowledge of the dead people mentioned by Mr. Taracila.

[Pavel] Do you do as the priest says or as the priest does?

[Marko] I think it is good if the priest practices what he preaches.

[Pavel] Let me imagine a double tragedy: your son marries a Romanian woman and your daughter marries a Romanian man.

[Marko] That is not only their right but also their business.

[Pavel] Do you like the Romanian press?

[Marko] It is very colorful and rich from a stylistic point of view, with very good lampoons and a lot of humor, but it is very superficial. There are few political analyses or analyses of the situation.

[Pavel] If God gave you absolute power and you could change or modify anything, how would you resolve the nationality issue?

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[Marko] ...Heh, heh. That's a very hard question.

[Pavel] There are no hard questions for a poet.

[Marko] In politics, there is not much room for a poet's fantasy. Indeed, I would have to be asked as a poet, so that I can respond to this question.

[Pavel] I am asking you as a man.

[Marko] Probably God had a purpose when He put us together in this place. We must accept this fact and not think about changing it. We must think about coexisting together so that each one will have the right to live his own life.

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Izetbegovic: Army Struggles for Unitary Bosnia

LD0702232095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 7 Feb 95

["Excerpts" of interview with President of Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic by Zvonimir Vidovic on 7 February; place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vidovic] An ever growing majority of people are in favor of (?the whole of) Bosnia-Herzegovina being liberated. What is your message to those people?

[Izetbegovic] I believe that no one should say anything other than this to the people. Simply, democracy does not grant the right to do such a thing. We all have the right to the freedom of thought, but we do not have the right to think that Bosnia will no longer exist or that it will not survive as a whole. This issue does not tolerate the difference of opinion and no one has the right to send a message that differs from this.

Our Army is fighting under the motto of the struggle for a unitary and democratic Bosnia. (?I'd better) say democratic Bosnia. I like to say that this Bosnia will be a country in which no one will be prosecuted because of his or her nationality, religion, or political opinions. Bosnia will be like that. I do not know what else it will be like but it will be a unitary country based on these three principles.

[Vidovic] Mr. Izetbegovic, you are a lawyer. You worked with [word indistinct] civil and business law. Now you deal with international, public law, and law on warfare. Let me ask you, the country's leading statesmen, something as an ordinary citizen listening to this program. Have you got the right to sign a document altering the historic borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are among the oldest in Europe, perhaps even the oldest in the world: Drina, Sava, Una.

[Izetbegovic] Now when you mentioned law, I have to say that I deal more with international injustice than justice because I face injustice more than justice and law. I am constantly coming against injustice and the absence of law on the part of the international community. But, let me answer your question.

I think that I do not have the right to do that.

[Question indistinct]

[Izetbegovic] The difficulties concerning the Federation stem from and are nowadays of the following nature: One side sees the federation as a way for Bosnia-Herzegovina to disappear as a Republic, while the other side—our side—sees it only as a path toward the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Essentially, when all the differences are considered, this is what remains: whether the federation is a way of [word indistinct] Bosnia-Herzegovina and reducing it to the federation, let us say, even within the Contact Group's plan's borders, or whether it is a path toward reintegration. We believe that the federation is a path toward the reintegration and we will persist on that path: Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders and the Federation as [word indistinct] state.

Silajdzic: UN Not Doing Enough To Feed Bihac

LD0702222595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Yasushi Akashi, special envoy of the UN secretary general for Bosnia-Herzegovina, has sent a letter to Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, which gives assessments of the humanitarian situation in the Bihac area. In an interview for Bosnia-Herzegovina television, our prime minister stresses that this is a simply a matter of an assessment of the situation, and that nothing specific has been done.

[Begin Silajdzic recording] It is said that the UN is attempting to do something in terms of opening up roads in talks with the aggressors. However, this situation is not getting any better. I have to say that in all probability a fresh offensive on Bihac is being prepared. Naturally, this could lead to the complete cutting of communications, and then the area would be surrounded and thousands of people would not be able to feed themselves.

In our contacts today with Mr. Akashi and his colleagues, we wanted to explain this situation—this serious situation—to them. We have public canteens in Bihac which are not working because they do not have food.

The problem of medicines is slightly less severe, but the problem of food is very difficult. What should be done? Both we and the UNHCR have together sought air dropping supplies. Such operations have been very successful and have saved a considerable number of lives in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

However, in this instance, when it is a matter of overflying Bihac, UNHCR and NATO planes which fly these missions simply fear that they will be shot down. They do not want to risk it so they are refraining from undertaking such missions. However, we will have to find ways of feeding these people, otherwise I do not know whether we will be able to observe the cease-fire. People will have to launch attacks in order to get food. At that point, I think we are no longer responsible for [word indistinct].

The situation is alarming. I would not say it is tragic at this point in time, but it is alarming, and in Mr. Akashi's letter I do not see—apart from some assessments and talks with the Serbian side—I do not see that anything much has been achieved here, although I see that persistent efforts are being made to this end. [end recording]

Says Situation Truce Threat

AU0702202095 Paris AFP in English 1958 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 7 (AFP)—Severe food shortages in the Bihac pocket in northwestern Bosnia-Herzegovina could impel the population under

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siege there to break the five-week-old ceasefire, Bosnian premier Haris Silajdzic warned Tuesday [7 February].

Speaking on Bosnian television, Silajdzic said the food situation in Bihac was "alarming."

He said the government had asked the United Nations to carry out air-drops but said the idea had been rejected by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) for fear that the planes could be shot down.

"This is why we will have to find another way to feed the population there, otherwise I don't know how we will we be able to maintain the ceasefire," Silajdzic said.

"The people will have to break through in order to feed themselves," Silajdzic said.

According to Kris Janowski, the UNHCR spokesman in Sarajevo, UN convoys are being impeded by anti-government forces.

Rebel Moslem leader Fikret Abdic's troops are demanding 50 percent of all UNHCR goods brought into Bihac, forcing the organisation to find alternative routes to avoid Abdic-controlled territory.

Nearly 100 hungry people demonstrated in Bihac town Monday asking for food, Janowski said.

Only six UNHCR convoys reached the pocket in January, carrying 300 [metric] tonnes of food. The area needs 1,900 tonnes a month, Janowski said.

"If in the next 60 days there is no stabilisation in convoy movement, the situation will become critical," Janowski warned.

The northern part of the Bihac pocket has seen fierce fighting between the Bosnian army and the combined forces of Abdic and the Croatian Serbs, neither of whom have agreed to the four-month truce in force since January 1.

Zagreb-Belgrade Deal Against Bosnia Suspected

AU0702175795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Feb 95

[Report by Nada al-Isa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] They stress in Zagreb that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is not in a terrible crisis, although the Croatian and Muslim approaches to the federation differ, as they say.

Miomir Zuzul, President's Tudjman special envoy at the recent Munich meeting, said this, adding that the Muslims are slowing down the federation by trying to impose the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as something superior to the federation. However, Zuzul says, the Croats want the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be just a transitional form until the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina is solved.

There is a lot of insistence in Zagreb, and perhaps too much—particularly after Munich—that there is no Croat-Serb secret agreement detrimental to Bosnia. Foreign Minister Granic has been announcing a trip to Belgrade recently, but also giving assurances that there will be no deals against Bosnia. However, Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak admitted upon returning from Munich that U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry was particularly interested in Munich in whether Bosnia has any cause for concern over, for example, Granic's trip to Belgrade and any future Croat-Serb meetings.

Some take the view here that Croatia could immediately show its honest intentions toward Bosnia by showing an interest in a speedier signing of 14 agreements on relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which—let me remind you—were agreed upon last August at the Izetbegovic-Tudjman talks in Zagreb. For example, the agreement on visas and the return of refugees should be signed urgently.

Here is why: A group of Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees returning from Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] recently tried to return to Sarajevo and Tuzla via Split. However, they have been unable for some 10 days now to obtain a Croatian transit visa. The Croatian authorities offer this explanation: The agreement on visas and the return of refugees has not been signed yet! It is known that President Izetbegovic again insisted on the signing of these 14 agreements between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina during his recent visit to Zagreb. Still, such wishes fall on deaf ears in Zagreb.

Will the Munich meeting bring about the signing of these agreements? They cover some vitally important issues for Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as the return of the refugees, which in turn requires Croatian transit visas.

General Vows To Link Up With Corps in Krajina

AU0702170895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the end of their training and the presentation of awards by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency to certain units of the 7th Corps, a ceremony was held today in Travnik, attended by Supreme Commander of the Army General Rasim Delic, Brigadier General Ramiz Drekovic, Brigadier General Jovan Divjak, Brigadier General Fikret Muslimovic, Brigadier General (Zico) Suljevic, and Brigadier General Mehmed Alagic, and the presidents of the districts of Travnik, Zenica, Mostar, Banja Luka, and others. Razija Mehic has a report:

[Begin Mehic recording] Following the report and the inspection of the troops, the salute to the flag, and prayers, Supreme Commander Rasim Delic addressed the imposing ranks of the fighters, congratulating them on behalf of the entire army and the Supreme Headquarters for the recognition that they were receiving.

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I am impressed with this previously unseen alignment, which illustrates our strength and power in the best possible way and guarantees our success in future battles. We have to strengthen our forces and take advantage of the cease-fire to train and prepare for the struggle unless a political solution is found, which is highly unlikely as it would mean the aggressor giving up the project of greater Serbia and the annihilation of the Muslim Bosniaks and accepting responsibility for the war crimes. The aggressor cares nothing about the cease-fire, as is best illustrated in the case of Bihac.

Before the awards were presented, that most ceremonial of acts, the troops and guests present were addressed by Brigadier Mehmed Alagic.

This is wartime and the aggressor has not given up his goals or honored any of the agreements. This cease-fire so far has enabled us to build on the old and attain new knowledge, and to improve our internal organization. Attacks on the 5th Corps are attacks on the 7th Corps. This is our message. We will link up with the 5th Corps somewhere in Krajina.

In a most splendid ceremony, the award-giving began with the bestowing of the honorary title of Chivalrous to the 17th Glorious Krajina Brigade. Gen. Delic presented a plaque of honor to the brigade commander, saying that the brigade fully deserved to be called chivalrous. Apart from this brigade, several others were given the title of glorious: the 705th, made up mostly of Jajce men, the 707th Bugojno, and the 727th Krajina. From today they have become glorious brigades, and their struggle justifies the title. Gen. Delic awarded plaques of honor to these brigades as well and Gen. Alagic gave [words indistinct]. The 707th Muslim Light Brigade was given war colors for its first anniversary. Brig. Fikret (Tuckic) and Colonel Asim (Koritic) were given gold lily medals for their extraordinary contribution to the Liberation War. Thus ended the ceremonial part and the program for the citizens started.

Thousands of fighters paraded through the town. For the first time artillery, tanks, and missile systems could be seen all in one place. Today was further proof that the 7th Corps has the courageous fighters, military hardware, and motivation needed to the continue the liberation of the occupied territories. (end recording)

UN Says 'No Proof' of FRY Overflights

LD0702165695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1559 GMT 7 Feb 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb. 7 (TANJUG)—United Nations Protection Force spokesman in Zagreb Paul Risley Tuesday [7 February] said there was no proof that Yugoslav helicopters had crossed into the Bosnian Serb republic.

Risley said that a number of helicopters had been sighted in the region of Srebrenica, but that there was no proof they had come from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He said the aircraft had not been seen on radar.

THE NEW YORK TIMES on Sunday said that 15-20 helicopters had been sighted near Srebrenica (Muslim enclave in eastern Bosnia) over the weekend and that they had allegedly come from Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav army headquarters said on Monday that the newspaper reports on the alleged incursion of the helicopters into Bosnian Serb airspace were a 'relatively primitive fabrication.'

There have been no Yugoslav army members in the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina since May 1992, and this has been confirmed by numerous U.N. reports.

In Aug. 4 1994, Yugoslavia severed all political and economic links with the Bosnian Serb republic after it rejected the 'Contact Group' plan for the territorial division of Bosnia.

Civilian monitors were then stationed along the Yugoslav-Bosnian Serb border. U.N. Security Council resolution 781 on Oct. 9 1992 banned all military flights over Bosnia.

Serb Helicopter Overflights Spotted Over Brcko

AU0802100895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 8 Feb 95

[Report by Mihad Salihovic from Brcko]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following yesterday's usual provocations and sniper fire, the aggressor early in the evening opened fierce machine gun fire on defense positions along the Bajici-Djukici line.

The Chetniks were even more active along the central Brcko defense line, where large enemy saboteur groups on several occasions attempted to penetrate our defense lines in every direction.

The 108th Motorized Brigade fighters responded effectively in each case.

We also noted intense traffic along the so-called Brcko corridor last night. All of last night, Brcko was overflown by the aggressor's helicopters, which were flying in both directions along the Bijeljina-Brcko-Modrica route. Such extensive use of enemy air transportation in the so-called Brcko corridor was last observed during the aggressor's most fierce attacks on Bihac.

Karadzic Demands Representation of Serb Republic

LD0702201695 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1844 GMT 7 Feb 95

[Item received via fax]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 7 Feb (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb republic, stated for SRNA today that a new international conference on former Yugoslavia made sense only if it was "prepared well on the basis of the real state of affairs."

President Karadzic stressed that the "Serb republic is a reality—it has to be represented at every summit," and "it cannot recognize results of conferences in which it has not participated."

"Tudjman and Izetbegovic cannot represent the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] and the Serb republic," Karadzic stressed, commenting on a proposal for a tripartite meeting between the presidents of Serbia and Croatia, and the leader of some Bosnian Muslims.

The Serb republic president holds that only simultaneous recognition of all the states created in the wake of Yugoslavia's disintegration—Slovenia, Croatia, RSK, Serb republic, Croat-Muslim Federation, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Macedonia [Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]—can prevent a new great war. After recognizing these states, establishment of new links will be possible.

"The Contact Group plan for former Bosnia-Herzegovina could possibly serve as a basis for negotiations and nothing else, while the Z-4 [mini contact group consisting of the United States, Russia, EU, and UN] plan is not worth anything because the RSK has not accepted it, which must be taken as a reality," Karadzic said, commenting on a statement by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe that the initiative for a new conferences was in line with plans of the international community for former Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

President Karadzic warned that "the RSK and the Serb republic will not accept a fait accompli, in the same way as they did not accept the unilateral secession of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina." He added:

"If pressure on us continues, we will go for the unification of the RSK and the Serb republic, and the world will have to recognize that. If we had united with Yugoslavia in 1991, the war would have been avoided, and we would now be a recognized country. It is not too late for us to unite now, and thus put the world in front of a fait accompli."

The Serb republic president stressed that he did not believe "that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic will accept fresh blackmail concerning the recognition of the former Yugoslav Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina."

"Milosevic refused to accept a similar document in the Hague in 1991 and we were all proud of him then. If he did now what he refused to do four years ago, neither history nor his contemporaries would forgive him," Karadzic said.

Expressing his belief that the sanctions would not be lifted even if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recognized former Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Karadzic recalled that Iraq was cheated in a similar way when it recognized Kuwait.

"The sanctions are planned to remain in place until the separation of Kosovo and until the process of dividing the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's assets is completed," president Karadzic warned and said that only the Serb republic could lift them "with a firm position, military victories, and the demand that the sanctions be lifted as a precondition for a final solution to the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

"Giving in under pressure from the West is a historic catastrophe. We must remain adamant and we will win," the Serb republic president said in the statement for SRNA.

Pejanovic Accepts Juppe Invitation to Paris

AU0602204195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 6 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Mirko Pejanovic, president of the Serbian Civic Council [SGV] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today received Henri Jacolin, French ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Jacolin gave Pejanovic French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe's answer to a letter addressed to him by the SGV in December 1994 pertaining to the SGV's role in the peace process and negotiations.

Juppe answered that he considered important the existence of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and their organization in the form of the SGV which is committed to an integral and multicultural Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mirko Pejanovic told B-H Press.

The letter stresses the importance of the Serbs' equal participation in decisions pertaining to peace solutions for Bosnia-Herzegovina together with other parties. Pejanovic said that the SGV had accepted Juppe's invitation to send a delegation to Paris for talks.

Comment on Carter Agreement, Contact Group

AU0702085695 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by M. Maric: "Three Peoples—Equal Rights"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka—"If the agreement is observed, and if all the conditions that the three sides have committed themselves to are fulfilled, then a sort of at least initial mutual trust will be established," Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the Srpska republic, stated in the broadcast "In Defense of the Fatherland" shown by Serbian Radio-Television. According to Buha, the agreement anticipates the cease-fire that came into force on 23 December 1994, as well as the truce from 31 December last year. The agreement leaves room for the Contact Group to come up with new proposals.

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Buha believes that the negotiations should be carried out simultaneously on several planes. In addition to the questions of demarcation and political settlement, a document must be worked out regarding the implementation of the peace agreement. Finally, he gave his opinion on what we are most interested in—lifting of the sanctions against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]: "Judging from the negotiations so far, it can be concluded that the Contact Group still founds its attitude on the assumptions that are quite unfavorable for us, and on the basis of which no satisfactory solution can be achieved," Buha said.

He adds, however, that the Contact Group insists on the continuation of the negotiations, but under the condition that the Bosnian Serbs accept the plan, which means that the Group has given up the second clause of Carter's agreement. The Contact Group, according to Buha, has appeared as the only competent factor authorized to negotiate, although in the aforementioned clause it is said that the Contact Group is only the patron, while it is the mediators who ought to be involved in the negotiations between the Group and the warring factions. "On the other hand," Buha adds, "in Carter's agreement it is said that the Contact Group's proposal will be taken as a basis for negotiations on all the issues, while the Group has insisted that the proposal be accepted." Buha also warned that the proposal does not contain all the elements that are, by definition, parts of the peace plan. It does not anticipate access to the sea, the partition of Sarajevo and its broader region, while it has also turned out that the Contact Group does not have a mandate to change anything in the plan. The most disputed issue is the Contact Group's refusal to accept the second clause of Carter's agreement, which stipulates that all three warring factions must be treated equally. This means that the Serbian Republic, as far as the state attributes are concerned, would be made equal to the Muslim-Croatian Federation, and also that the Serbian people would be recognized the same right that other two peoples have. Buha also said that the Contact Group had tacitly accepted the second clause of Carter's agreement, but it had not been willing to stand up for it. He added that the war must be ended by eliminating its very causes, that is, the aspiration of the Muslims and the Croats to dominate over the Serbian people in former Bosnia-Herzegovina. "The war must be ended by separating the three peoples and recognizing their right to constitute their nation states in the way that best suits them," Buha concluded.

Bill Viewed as Giving 'Kingly Rights' to Deputies

AU0602171695 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Feb 95 p 13

[Article by Nikola Trklja: "Life-Long Parliamentary Immunity"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The new bill on the rights of assembly deputies in the Srpska republic, which is supposed to be brought up for discussion in the assembly of the Srpska republic soon, has attracted the attention of the political public and drawn severe criticism on the part of the opposition. The opposition representatives have assessed the new bill as unconstitutional and undemocratic, since it is about privileges that provide kingly rights for assembly deputies.

Severe Criticism

[Passage omitted] Why is this bill, which the opposition parties say has already been put to the vote, causing such severe criticism?

According to the opposition, the commission of the assembly of the Srpska republic, headed by Srdjo Srdic, deputy from Prijedor, has produced a bill on parliamentary rights that makes it possible for the deputies to enjoy life-long parliamentary immunity. This actually means that the deputies of the assembly of the Srpska republic would be protected by law even after their mandate expires, after they take up another duty, or retire, and in similar cases.

Such an act would empower former deputies not to appear in the court of law and to draw upon their parliamentary immunity in the event charges are brought against them, that is, if they commit a civil or criminal offense for which a penal measure shorter than the lawful census [word as published] (according to the right regulated by parliamentary status) is anticipated.

Moreover, as the representatives of the opposition parties point out, the new bill also provides the deputies with the right to a national pension, and it settles their housing problems, provides free removal of furniture, free personal and family protection, free spa treatments, and a series of other privileges.

The opposition also claims that beside this bill there are certain amendments to the law on the deputies' rights and duties. The amendments provide for the possibility for deputies to veto certain decisions in municipalities.

"Since many municipalities have not observed the regulations prescribed by the law and the work of their deputies, who are their only connection with the republic, we propose that deputies be given certain lawful authorizations enabling them to veto certain decisions made by municipal bodies, to forward such cases to the higher republican bodies and await their final solution," it is said in this unusual bill.

Furthermore, it is envisaged that each deputy in his or her municipality must be a member of the cadre commission, the cadre commission of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] and the cadre commission of the municipal assembly, which will make decisions on cadres by consensus. In the case of a state of war, according to the bill, each deputy, being a representative of the republic, must be a member of the municipal war staff.

The obvious desire of the legislators to completely centralize decisionmaking and place the local administrations under the direct control of parliament has been

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severely condemned by the opposition parties, which assessed the entire issue as usurpation of authority. The opposition points out that deputies are not in parliament to avail themselves of certain privileges, but to represent the will of the people, while the people's will is that they bring the fighting to an end, rather than to pass the bill on parliamentary privileges. [passage omitted]

Krajisnik Opposes Elections During Wartime

LD0702162995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1414 GMT 7 Feb 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 7 (TANJUG)—Speaker of the Bosnian Serb assembly Momcilo Krajisnik said Tuesday [7 February] that multiparty elections in wartime would weaken the country militarily.

Speaking for Studio Sarajevo based in Pale, Bosnian Serb political center, Krajisnik said under the Bosnian Serb Constitution the mandates of the assembly and of all its deputies were to be extended until immediate war danger and the state of war were over.

Four major Bosnian Serb opposition parties, the Serb Democratic Party 'Fatherland's Front', the Banja Luka-based Serb Radical Party, the National Radical Party and the Socialist Party, urged immediate elections at a meeting held in the town of Prijedor, northwestern Bosnia, on Jan. 28.

Commenting on the opposition's view that elections can be held in wartime because three plebiscites have been organized in such conditions, Krajisnik said citizens voted on crucial issues in the plebiscites, regardless of the party they belonged to.

Krajisnik said, 'as soon as the war ends and we achieve the goals we have set—the securing of a state and freedom of the Serb people—it will be inevitable to hold elections.'

Army Deputy Commander Says Forces 'Combat Ready'

BR0702154495 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 6 Feb 95 p 6

[Article on interview with Colonel Makar, deputy commander of the Bosnian Army Second Corps, by Fredrik Braconier in Tuzla; date not given: "Bosnia Could Win the War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tuzla—If the political will exists in Bosnia and Croatia the war against the Bosnian Serbs could be won. If the Serbian corridor in northeastern Bosnia is cut the Bosnian Serbs would lose the major part of their territory. The Serbs in Croatia would also be cut off.

So said Colonel Makar to SVENSKA DAGBLADET. He is deputy commander of the Bosnian Army second corps, in the Tuzla region.

The second corps is the unit which for the past month has been blockading the Nordbat [Nordic battalion] positions and the UN forces at Tuzla airport. Colonel Makar wants to tone down the disagreements.

"Nordbat's presence means a lot to us. The problems have been due to an incorrect interpretation of the rules," he said.

Colonel Makar doubts whether peace is on its way in Bosnia. The agreement for a cease-fire has not been implemented on all points, he said, pointing to the fighting around Bihac.

"The Serbs are preparing themselves to continue the war. Because of losses of men and territory they agreed to the cease-fire."

In the colonel's view the second corps is well prepared for new fighting. He put the corps strength at 30 brigades which embrace 70,000 men when fully mobilized. Estimates from Nordbat give somewhat lower figures.

The second corps deputy commander has no hesitation about calling his forces the most combat-ready army in the world. It has now taken considerable quantities of arms and prisoners of war from the enemy.

"We are stronger than the enemy in every respect. Our problem is not inferiority when it comes to tanks. At the beginning of the war the ratio was 1:200. Now it is 1:6."

Local arms production is also increasing, Makar claimed. The area controlled by the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia also contains the biggest arms production installations in the former Yugoslavia. "We are producing missiles and heavy howitzers," he said.

"In 1992 I was at the Serbian corridor. Then it was only 2,000 meters wide at its narrowest point. All the military wanted to cut it, but the political will was lacking."

He does not think that the political will to do so exists today either. In his view, Croatia will choose a different alternative. Zagreb is cooperating with the Serbs in Croatia through the December agreement on the opening of the freeway, oil pipelines, and so on.

Colonel Makar's view of the Croatian position carries special weight. He is in fact a Croat himself. In addition he is also married to a Serbian woman. The commander corresponds to the ideal picture of Bosnia as a multiethnic society.

However, certain questions are too sensitive. He said that only the UN embargo is what stops the Bosnian Army from getting heavy arms from outside. The question of why Croatia is able to rearm despite this same embargo went unanswered.

And the colonel must be aware that his multiethnic hopes are being undermined with every day that passes. The Serbs that remain move as soon as they can. It is

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only in the Tuzla area that Muslims and Croats have been able to cooperate militarily.

In other parts of Bosnia the Muslim-Croat understanding is very fragile. According to Nordbat, disagreements are also growing in the region of the second corps. The possibility of victory is being frustrated by the internal split.

Today the Serb corridor is only 5 km wide near the town of Brecko. On the other side of the border river of Sava lies Croatia and somewhat further west a Croat area in Bosnia. A coordinated action could cut the vital Bosnian Serb lifeline.

However, Bosnia's officers seem to doubt whether the order will come. The war in Bosnia is full of large and small puzzles.

Minister Views Industrial Production, Goals

AU0702152795 Sarajevo SARAJEVO TIMES in Serbo-Croatian Feb 95 p 9 (Tentative)

[Interview with Faruk Smailbegovic, industry and energy minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Ahmet Metiljevic; place and date not given: "The Year of Very Difficult Tests"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite the war and formidable destruction in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is optimism regarding the surmounting of the problems in the transformation of the economy. This optimism is not groundless if we take into account the natural, human, and production potentials that interesting and attractive to foreign investors. Furthermore, the emotional charge in our people may also be valuable, since they have a great trust and readiness to bear an even greater burden for a better future....

What is the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina doing in that respect in order to help the revival of production and the normalization of the economy in general through planning the measures of economic policy and creating favorable conditions for it? We discussed this question, as well as the program of economic measures for 1995, the first document of that kind adopted in the course of war, with Faruk Smailbegovic, minister for industry and energy in the government of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Back to the Beginning

[Metiljevic] What awaits businessmen and firms in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, and what will their immediate future be like?

[Smailbegovic] As long as there is no peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and people are not able to travel by car or by train, it is impossible to talk about the establishment of any sensible economic policy. Still, even in such difficult war conditions, the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina has adopted the program of economic measures for 1995. The first and most important task is to normalize the situation in the economy and virtually start from scratch again.

The basic question is for how long we shall be living in the difficult situation of social and war tensions until the exploitation of natural, human, and production capacities begins. There is a fear that many people are not fully aware of the depth of the crisis, of the dimensions of changes that must be made in our economy, which may cause even deeper traumas.

Let me state several data, just to illustrate the complexity of the situation. In the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are 1.8 million Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs, and others living. In 1994, around 45,000 people were employed in industry and other branches, and what they produced for the market could have been accomplished by 6,000 to 7,000 workers. At the same time, 580,000 various consumers (pensioners, civil servants, medical staff, teachers, police, members of the army, and so forth) are on the payroll of the state.

Because of the war damage, Bosnia-Herzegovina will be a poor country for a long time, both in terms of the individual assets of the citizens and in terms of the state economy, and the transformation into new proprietary relations certainly cannot be accomplished at once, or in a short time. It is also true that foreign investors will consider our country to be a high-risk region, and they will not rush to invest their money here. For that reason, one should not have unrealistically high expectations and draw upon inaccurate data when speaking about the international financial aid. Dollars do not grow on trees anywhere in the world. The best promotion of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be the creation of market conditions in which the aid will be used efficiently.

Three Strategic Projects

[Metiljevic] Our businessmen say that any kind of advance planning or making business forecasts is more difficult for them than ever before. They are mostly groping in the dark of general uncertainty. What are the republican planners absorbed in, and will the situation become clearer in 1995 in that respect?

[Smailbegovic] First and foremost, they are absorbed in the problems regarding the maintenance of economic activities, as well as using legal measures and means in efforts to rescue some of the most important branches from sinking. The second preoccupation is the creation of necessary conditions for the changeover of our economy from the one based on agreements and state ownership into a market economy with the clearly defined ownership. In 1995, the realization of three large strategic projects is supposed to begin. The first project is the transformation. We presented the project to the Americans and they were quite astonished at what we

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have accomplished so far in that respect. The first phase is the nationalization of firms. By the end of 1995, we are supposed to draw up an inventory and complete the identification of property, as well as to pass the remaining legal regulations.

The second project relates to the technological development of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina was predominantly based on raw materials, and that structure ought to be changed to the benefit of an export-orientated economy. In that sense, the government has decided to open the doors wide to foreign capital, and without any limits.

The third project refers to the primary production of food. In 1994, we did a lot in that respect. We presented the project to the World Bank, the Islamic Bank in Jedda, and other international financial institutions. The realization of the project demands a great number of new acts and legal regulations, while a more important factor is that we plan to sow 175,000 hectares of arable land with different crops as early as this year.

In this war that destroys and devastates anything made by human hand, it is difficult to disregard the fact that, in peacetime, one lives from one's own work, new products, new values, and from the development and progress in any respect—material as well as spiritual. Therefore, 1995 will be the year of very difficult tests, but also the year of moves toward a better future. Thus, in 1995, we have planned the production of around 3 billion kilowatt-hours of electric energy, by which we would meet the basic needs of our industry and households. Furthermore, in the field of industry (excluding ferrous metallurgy and the chemical industry), the value of production should amount to 35 to 40 percent of the value that was accomplished in 1991. In order to achieve that, we have presented 170 programs for the revitalization and renewal of the production (the textile industry, the footware industry, the construction materials industry, the production of means of personal hygiene, the pharmaceutical industry, and so forth). We need $50 million for the realization of those programs. In 1995, the economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina should accomplish one sixth of the 1991 gross national product. Those are huge leaps and they demand better organization in every firm, as well as the cooperation of the firms.

Development Under War Conditions

[Metiljevic] It has been said that the government was insufficiently engaged in the economy in the past year, particularly in the creation of the market conditions and the establishment of some lasting and general rules of the game.

[Smailbegovic] I am familiar with such assessments, but they are unfounded and malicious. The government is, I would say, engaged intensively in the economy, and, as you put it, in the establishment of some general rules of the game. Let us recall the recently adopted Law on Ownership Transformation, the Law on Firms, the legal regulations regarding customs policy and transactions with hard currencies, and so forth. In 1995, the parliament will discuss 40 further bills that are a precondition for the creation of the market conditions and general rules of the game.

In addition to all this, the state has also been included in the economic microcosm. In fact, only last year, real activities regarding the establishment of the economic system of the country began. Take the energy system of the republic, for example, where everybody felt called upon to run the business. In 1994, we have overcome that problem, so that now the electric power industry works as a unique system. What should be mentioned particularly is the fact that the Electric Power Industry of Bosnia-Herzegovina produced 1.3 billion kilowatt-hours of power in 1994, while 400,000 metric tons of coal was mined for the needs of thermal power stations. That was a huge effort. Because, if we want to secure at least 1,000 kilowatt-hours of power for each household in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then we must spend 220 million German marks for that.

In addition, this task of providing electric energy has played a crucial role in the revival of the industrial production, and it has made it possible for us to have at least a little better life than before. Such interventions by the state, undoubtedly necessary under conditions of war, are frequently criticized even by those who, through the inertia of old habits and attitudes, demand an intervention by the state whenever they happen to be in difficulties, while on the other hand considering it to be directly responsible for the fate of certain firms. Under the conditions in which the public firms have been nationalized, and in such critical war conditions, such concrete measures by the state were inevitable.

Article Questions Revenues Bypassing State

AU0302124995 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jan 95 p 8

[Article by Ivan Sabic: "Where Is the Money Going?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the issues raised whenever there is discussion—formally or informal—of the difficulties of implementing the Croat-Muslim federation Constitution is the issue of introducing a single monetary, tax, and customs system. Representatives of the Muslim side regularly point out that the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosna collects customs duties and spends them, through its budget, without the authorities in Sarajevo knowing about it. They propose that an end finally be put to the situation, that is, that the customs revenues be redirected to the National Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the budget of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"The state did not charge anything for incoming goods at the Mostar-Travnik road state border during the period between April and July (the Croat Defense Council did). It thus lost about 15 million German marks (according to the estimates of the presidents of the Mostar and Travnik regions), which is a great failure. The state

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cannot be based on free work and other people's charity," says, among other things, one of the twelve items of the tasks for the state bodies, stated by Alija Izetbegovic at the recent 6th session of the Head Committee of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA].

Jewelry Instead of Weapons

However, the Croat representatives do not believe that the problem will be resolved by abolishing Herzeg-Bosna or redirecting the customs revenues to Sarajevo. Federation President Kresimir Zubak claims that there are documents to account for each kuna not paid into the joint budget during the past period, and raises the issue of the "huge inflow of aid" from many Islamic countries regarding which it can neither be traced to an account nor is it possible to see where the money is spent.

Zubak thus broached the subject that "comes to the surface" from time to time. Naturally, it is not only that Zubak lacks precise information, but only those who are directly involved in collecting the aid and deciding what it will be used for have it. The figures used by different sources therefore differ to a certain extent. It is possible to hear from "well-informed sources" that on a certain occasion a certain official had a sack of dollars, the weight and final destination of which it is not possible to determine. Although it is not easy to establish the credibility of these stories, there is no doubt that the aid is coming in, and that a good part of it slips past the state institutions.

From Moscow radio we found out recently that the Turkish SABAH had asked several unpleasant questions, one of which was dedicated to speculation about the money collected as aid to the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. SABAH asked Izetbegovic whether 350 million dollars was "sitting" in a special Swiss bank account, and where the money is now. There is also talk about 20 million dollars of aid collected in Norway that allegedly "got lost" on the way to Sarajevo, and a story about an alleged offer of Saudi King Fahd to deliver 250 million dollars worth of antiarmor weapons to the Muslim formations, and Izetbegovic's alleged reply that he would rather have jewelry worth 50 million dollars, which is in fact a direct accusation that he wrongfully appropriated such an amount, since it is clear that he would not put jewelry into the vaults of the National Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Whose Fingers Are Sticky?

Where there is smoke, there is fire—as far as financial manipulations of the Muslim administration is concerned, the above mentioned are not mere guesses, which can be concluded from the appearances of some Muslim officials, who point out that there are some strange financial pathways. Irfan Ljubijankic, foreign minister of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, recently stated, talking about replacements and firing employees of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy in Zagreb: "The other phenomenon was insufficient financial control and insufficient insight into where the funds were going."

The same issues are discussed and decided upon at other levels. Muhamed Sadikovic, member of the SDA Regional Committee, pointed out, for instance, at one of the committee sessions: "There have been various manipulations with the collected money," and "a great number of honest people were cheated, since their money never arrived at certain addresses in the homeland."

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has caused production to be halted, so all the sources of financing the military and state services have dried up. Substitutes are sought in collecting contributions from friendly countries and political organizations, as well as citizens who temporarily work abroad. Since there is no record of funds collected this way, it could easily happen that it "sticks to someone's fingers," and that the rest is spent without the knowledge of state financial institutions, which Kresimir Zubak pointed out in the above statement.

It is therefore obvious that the issue of uniting the free territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the monetary, tax, and customs sense will not end with the funds collected from customs simply being redirected toward Sarajevo. There is no doubt that the Croat side will insist that all the funds that Bosnia-Herzegovina gets in any way first pass through state financial institutions, and that the budget include appropriate funds to finance the Croat Defense Council formations and meet other needs in the territory under Croat control.

Muslims Being Forced To Convert to Catholicism

95P20448A

[FBIS Media Note] The 15 December issue of the Split daily SLOBODNA DALMACIJA reported allegations of "recent" forced conversions of Muslims to Catholicism in Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the daily, the allegations had been made by the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the leadership of the Islamic religious community. During the daily's interview with Mostar mufti Seid Smajkic, one of those who had raised the issue of forced conversions, Smajkic said that while there had been pressures on the Muslims to convert during the war between Bosnian Muslims and Croats this was actually happening in areas under the control of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) since the signing of the Washington Agreement. Asked to give the reasons why Muslims would convert to a different faith, Smajkic said that above all was fear for their lives, and coercion by various groups, especially paramilitary groups. He blamed a "lack of humanitarian aid, hunger, [the need] to find employment" and the desire for what he called "social and political security." Smajkic gave some details about the alleged conversions, claiming to "know that in the Mostar region, in the area that is under the control of the

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HVO, 750 to 800 people converted from Islam to the Catholic religion. In Capljina 700 Muslims were converted and in Ljubuski 150." He charged that the conversions were done "by Catholic priests," naming one priest in particular as "the one who worked the most on this." The paper also reported that Monsignor Luka Pavlovic, vicar of the Mostar-Duvno Diocese, denied these allegations, noting that there had been only a few conversions during the Muslim-Croat war, and none, to his knowledge, "by force."

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UN: Serbs Warned About Using Udbina Airfield

LD0702144595 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Serbs have again started using Udbina airfield, which is situated in the occupied area of Croatia, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] Spokesman Paul Risley said at a news conference today. We have a report by Tihomir Vinkovic:

[Vinkovic] One aircraft and two helicopters have been spotted taking off from Udbina airfield, but UNPROFOR as usual cannot confirm whether or not they have entered Bosnia-Herzegovina air space. Irrespective of that fact, UNPROFOR representatives have warned the Serbs in occupied areas that NATO will go into action if these flights continue. [passage omitted]

Russian Envoy Says Z-4 Plan 'Still on Table'

LD0702201795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1720 GMT 7 Feb 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb. 4 (TANJUG)—The Russian representative in the 'Zagreb Four' group of international mediators, Leonid Kerestedijanc has said that the Z-4 plan was still on the table.

How long the plan to resolve the Croatia-Serb Krajina conflict would remain on the table depended on both the Zagreb and Knin governments, he said in a statement for the Croatian television late on Monday.

Kerestedijanc, who is Russian ambassador in Zagreb, said that the Z-4 plan was balanced for both sides and that it represented a compromise and attempt to arrive at a joint solution.

Members of the Z-4 group on Jan. 30 presented a draft plan for settling the Croatia-Serb Krajina dispute which Zagreb has not definitely rejected while Knin has not yet taken into consideration.

Serbs in Croatia set up their own state, the Republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution.

Knin is the administrative centre of Serb Krajina.

U.N. Protection Force [UNPROFOR] troops were deployed in the Serb Krajina in March, 1992, until a political settlement of the Knin-Zagreb conflict was found.

The Zagreb authorities which have never recognized the Republic of Serb Krajina for regarding it as 'Croatia's occupied territory', on Jan. 12 said they would deny hospitality to UNPROFOR troops after their six-month mandate expired on March 31.

Asked why in the Z-4 plan the two sides were 'indirectly being treated on an equal footing' when the 'Serbs occupied a part of Croatian territory,' Kerestedijanc said that 'those who have been in this territory for long centuries can hardly be called occupiers.'

Kerestedijanc said the best solution was to have UNPROFOR stay on because its presence was needed even if the Z-4 plan were accepted.

Asked if Moscow would veto a possible proposal in the U.N. Security Council to change the current status of UNPROFOR by authorizing it to use force, Kerestedijanc briefly answered that 'Russia would seriously address that issue.'

Report on Bosnian Croat-Muslims Munich Meeting

LD0702174495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1727 GMT 7 Feb 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb 7 (TANJUG)—Zagreb has said it expects advancement in the realization of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia after the Bosnian Croats and Muslims met in Munich on Sunday.

The Croatian press, however, Tuesday said previous disagreements could continue.

Croatia's Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, Miomir Zuzul, who attended the Munich meeting, said the Muslim-Croat Federation 'was not in an especially big crisis,' but that in question was 'dissatisfaction over the concrete realization of the concept.'

In an interview to Split daily SLOBODNA DALMACIJA on Tuesday, Zuzul said 'certain world circles' were 'absolutely wrong' in blaming Croatia for the standstill in the process of setting up the Federation since 'the Federation is currently receiving the strongest support from Zagreb.'

SLOBODNA DALMACIJA said that 'by continuing the religious-ethnic homogenization of their regions, the Muslims themselves would jeopardize the idea of a multiethnic society.'

The paper said that even now in the 'one-nation army of Bosnia-Herzegovina the Muslim priests are increasingly more resembling political commissars than military priests.'

Zagreb daily VJESNIK said on Tuesday that 'even an international arbiter, proposed by the Munich plan, had little chance of resolving the (Muslim-Croat) disputes.'

VJESNIK said that the Bosnian Croats and Muslims 'are constantly struggling to preserve their positions and to gain new ones without much regard for the equality of nations and for constitutional definitions.'

At the Munich meeting, held under the auspices of the United States, the Bosnian Croats and Muslims adopted a ninepapoint plan whwch calls for the appointment of

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an international mediator to arbitrate disputes between the two sides. The Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia, declared in March 1994 at the insistence of the United States, failed to iron out the differences between the two nations which had fought year-long fierce battles for territories.

The Federation has only a president and government, while a joint army and local organs of power have never been set up.

Domestic Support for UNPROFOR Mandate

[95P20471A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jan 95 p 2]

[FBIS Media Note] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's decision not to renew the UN Protective Force (UNPROFOR) mandate when it expires on 31 March has been approved by the Croatian parliament, the National Security and Defense Council, and most of country's political parties. In addition, there has been a ground swell of support from the Croatian public, as evidenced by reports published in the major Zagreb daily VJESNIK beween 15 and 19 January.

According to VJESNIK of 15 January, "numerous telegrams and messages" were sent to the office of the president expressing "unanimous support" for his decision. Tomislav Mercep, president of the Association of Croatian Volunteers of the Homeland War (UHVDR), said in his letter that President Tudjman's decision would "speed up the process of political reintegration of the occupied Croatian territories and create a just peace for the suffering Croatian and Bosnian peoples." Mercep assured the president that his organization was ready to carry out any order from the Croatian head of state "quickly and efficiently." The UHVDR's Split-Dalmatia branch stated that its members stood prepared to "completely liberate Croatia." The Croatian Association of Political Prisoners sent a telegram expressing support and admiration for Tudjman's decision that Croatia "cancel further favors to UNPROFOR." The Executive Council of the Sisak-Moslovac Refugee Alliance stressed in its letter to Tudjman that his "decision has finally created the conditions for a united, sovereign, and independent Croatia."

The 16 January VJESNIK reported on a "large" meeting in Zagreb, organized by refugee organizations from Drnis, Unesic, Kijevo, Knin, Vrlika, and other Croatian towns, at which refugees thanked Tudjman for ending the UNPROFOR mandate and expressed their full support for his decision "in this crucial moment for reaching a just peace, stopping the violence, and strengthening democracy in Croatia." They called for "unity of all forces" to accomplish "vital Croatian national goals," to ensure the basic human right to "return to their homes," to protect "the life and property of Croatian citizens," to demilitarize the "temporarily occupied territories," and to uphold "law and order on the entire territory of Croatia." The refugees emphasized that they were "ready and determined" to return to and rebuild their homes and begin a new life in liberated Croat ia. The speakers opposed any concessions to UNPROFOR. The mayor of Vrlika assured the president that "he can count on 700 brave fighters" if the need arises.

On 17 January, the published expressions of support by Croatian political parties, associations, and individuals included telegrams from refugees from Vukovar and Petrinja expressing agreement with Tudjman's decision and hope that they would soon be able to return home. VJESNIK also reported that at a news conference, the governor of Bjelovar-Bilogora County stressed the importance of UNPROFOR's departure, saying that the " presence of blue helmets brought nothing but great damage" to the county.

Reporting on domestic reaction continued in the 18 January issue of VJESNIK and included a public announcement by the "Croatian Forum," which stated that the reintegration of the occupied territories should be viewed not as a military threat but as "the only way to guarantee normal development for all Croatian territories and all ethnic groups who live in them." A letter from the UHVDR signed by Generals Martin Spegelj and Ivan Prodan said that the Croatian Army was regaining trust as "a respectable and successful national institution which will ensure the implementation of national policy." In another telegram, the Croatian Officers Corps expressed "strong and decisive support" to President Tudjman.

A letter from members of the ruling Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) and "young people" from Gospic, published in VJESNIK of 19 January, expressed relief that "further occupation will not be tolerated" and the belief that "the Croatian soldier will soon stand at the internationally recognized border, and the refugees will return home." Another letter from the leaders of the Croatian Republican Community, a right-wing political party, endorsed the government decision but expressed the fear that, in the end, the UNPROFOR mandate might be extended, and that, as a result, Croatia would again be served "empty promises" by the United Nations.

Article in Weekly Seen as Media 'Witch Hunt'

95BA0120A Zagreb ARKZIN in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by Branslav Krivokapic: "New 'Witch-Hunt' in Media; Case of NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA: In Good Company"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *With the publication of this sort of pamphlet, the editors of NEDJELJNA have obviously opted for the methods of those who are "contemptuous of the world," the methods of defamation, slander, and unsubstantiated imputations, which lowers them to the level of the worst kind of yellow journalism.*

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On the day before the celebration of Christ's birth according to the Eastern calendar, on Christmas Eve, the treacherous kiss of Judas made an appearance in NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA, in an article by Vukasin Djuricic entitled "The Media's Fifth Column." In that "white paper" of our harsh reality, in that denunciatory pasquinade, domestic and foreign journalists (around 50 of them) are designated enemies of the state who are out to get Croatia with their false reporting. Some of the facts in the article are not accurate and some of the names have changed (they were obviously gathered earlier, so that the list includes, for example, no journalists from Radio Free Europe, whose editors will certainly be offended that they are not in such good company), but all of them are accused by name of applying "prochetnik" and "communist" methods to create an untruthful image of Croatia in the world. All of them write negatively about Croatia and are in the service of dark forces, especially Serbia. At the risk of associating with the large-moustached Georgian who began his speeches with "it is known..." or "it is a known fact...," Djuricic cites his own responsibility and the interest of the state, of which he is, of course, a loyal citizen and an even more loyal journalist. Croatia is a state at war, parts of its territory have been amputated, it is surrounded by many enemies, and it is normal that all this must be reflected in the reports of domestic and foreign journalists. The course has been set out in advance, and it must be adhered to. Despite this, Croatia is a free, democratic country and a rule-of-law state of equal citizens, with a high level of respect for human rights and with no inflation. Instead of presenting this information to the world's public, the denounced media are writing negative "prochetnik" reports and creating a negative image of Croatia. That is how the white paper was drawn up, the enemies are cited by name, and all that remains now is to clear some forest and begin making crosses. There will be plenty of money for carpenters!

Djuricic—Sincere Patriot?!

However, there is also another way of reading this article, which the SIS [Security Information Service] will probably immediately seize upon. Consciously sullying his honor by denouncing his colleagues, he has underscored the most important theme in his seemingly denunciatory article: All foreign agencies are simply conveying that which this human journalist has finally said openly, which we had only surmised and were afraid to acknowledge, that Croatia's reputation in the world is at rock-bottom! That required courage! A gallant lover of the truth, Djuricic has sounded the alarm about how this democratic state of ours is suffering from a serious case of "conspiracy syndrome" and is endeavoring to find enemies in everything around it. Freedom of opinion is guaranteed by the Constitution, but mostly only the one that is permitted. A person (or a journalist, whatever) can do whatever he wants under the condition that he gets permission. Not one other journalist has dared to depict his own state in such dark terms, and if it seems to people that this is one courageous journalist tilting at windmills, with no reverberations and to no advantage, then they are mistaken. This sort of struggle for the development of democratic relations, freedom, and tolerance will have to produce results sooner or later, because ultimately this snowball will set an avalanche in motion. That could even happen after the death of this courageous journalist, but he was also aware of that, ready to sacrifice himself for the truth. After this heroic act, it is clear that in the business sense the doors of all prominent world agencies are open to him, especially those in Serbia and Yugoslavia.

I Like Vukasin, but...

All joking aside, with the publication of this sort of pamphlet the editors of NEDJELJNA have obviously opted for the methods of those who are "contemptuous of the world," the methods of defamation, slander, and unsubstantiated imputations, which lowers them to the level of the worst kind of yellow journalism. After this scandal, it will be hard to readily believe them in the future. Shocked foreign journalists immediately sent a letter of protest to Minister of Culture Zlatko Vitez, seeking protection. But as they say in legal circles, the crime has already been committed. The NEDJELJNA correspondents' office in Zagreb reacted instantaneously to the journalists' protest, denying all charges. It said that the editors had simply "pointed out several journalists" who in the 1970's "ruled the roost in the Croatian media" and who until 1990 "unquestioningly served the communist Yugoslav regime," while today, as foreign correspondents, they put forward a "very agonizing truth about Croatia." On the front line of defense of the homeland, with money in hand, NEDJELJNA has decided to clear up this picture, because it is known that there is one and only one picture. The frayed story is repeated; once again, the blame for everything rests with the communists (who made up around 10 percent of the population in Yugoslavia, but apparently at least 90 percent of the population in Croatia—a nice and enviable communist tradition!), so that the basic task is to identify them. If the communists persecuted unlike-minded people in the old system, now former communists are persecuting former communists, if not for the same reasons. The positions have changed, but the methods have remained the same. Nothing new, the phlegmatic would say, because all of this has been seen hundreds of times, like in some bad movie. Only here and there does some new gunslinger emerge, demonstrating his obedience by providing corpses. Such people can be disdained, but they are there nonetheless. They sniff around, scheme, rummage, observe, and record, and people's necks become intolerably hot and clammy from their breath. Then they rush forward with their dirty reports to get a paternal caress and a lump of sugar as a reward.

Because exposing enemies is a very grueling and complicated job, we propose that they begin applying a tested formula described by Russian writer Danil Kharms in his "St. Petersburg Comedy." In order to uncover Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks released into the air a special gas that killed only communists.

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Unfortunately, Vuk Djuricic cannot be allowed into the lab where the search for such a useful gas will be conducted.

Media Discusses Need To Increase Birthrate

95P20469A Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 95 p 9

[FBIS Media Note] Recent articles in the Split daily SLOBODNA DALMACIJA and the Rijeka daily NOVI LIST discussed unfavorable demographic trends and the "urgent" need to increase the birthrate in Croatia. The articles also viewed measures the Croatian Government had undertaken to promote population growth.

An article titled "Croatian Demographic Drama" in the 14 January issue of SLOBODNA DALMACIJA described data on Croatia's birthrate compiled by the State Institute of Statistics as "relentless." According to the 1991 census, the population of Croatia was 4,784,265, the paper reported. It added that statistical data going back to the 1953 census revealed a constant decline in birthrate and that the 1993 rate of 10.1 births per thousand was lower than that of 1990. According to the paper, Croatia has not had a positive growth rate for three years. In 1993, deaths exceeded births by 2,311.

SLOBODNA DALMACIJA reported that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman had recently tasked the Ministry of Reconstruction and Development with the preparation and implementation of a program for "demographic renewal." In his 22 December State of Nation Address, reported the same day by the HINA press agency, Tudjman had stressed the need for demographic renewal, pointing to the declining birthrate and describing it as so low that the "Croatian people would face extinction if we were not to take resolute steps." He said that the preparation and implementation of a demographic revival plan should be one of the most important objectives of the Ministry of Reconstruction and Development, "although the entire state apparatus, as well as all the components of our national and social life, should also be held responsible for its implementation."

Ante Bakovic, a Roman Catholic priest and founder of the Croatian Population Movement, said in an interview in the 15 January SLOBODNA DALMACIJA that his movement's motto for 1994 had been "Children Are the Blessing of Croatia," while for 1995 it was "One Loves Croatia With Children." Bakovic said that his movement favored families having four children, opposed abortion and the migration of young women from villages to cities or abroad, and urged the establishment of a government ministry for family and population policy.

Press reports noted that some measures have already been taken to promote births, but some expressed doubt about the effectiveness of the measures. The 15 Janaury SLOBODNA DALMACIJA pointed out that recent income-tax code amendments give exemptions to families with several children, and that other measures exist that provide benefits to such families and those with newborn children. An article in the 21 January issue of NOVI LIST, however, termed inducements intended to increase family size insufficient and stated that few women would elect to have an additional child if they were unable to feed it. The article concluded that the greatest enemy of Croatia's population policy was the economic situation in the country.

Rift Noted Among Writers at PEN Centers

[95P20450A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 20 Dec 94 pp 6-10]

[FBIS Media Note] The 20 December issue of the Zagreb weekly DANAS reported extensively on a rift among Croatian writers that followed the adoption of a resolution presented by the Croatian delegation to the 61st World PEN Congress, held in Prague during 6-12 November 1994. The text of the resolution, as published by DANAS, stated that delegates to the PEN Congress "wish to offer cordial support to any initiative directed at promoting contact among the PEN centers of all the states in the territory of the former Yugoslavia" and that "all the PEN centers of this region pledge to support the recognition and defense of not only the cultural, but also the social and political rights" of national minorities. The resolution also stated that the Croatian PEN Center would continue to defend the rights of the Serb minority, as well as all other minorities, in Croatia. Following the adoption of the resolution, DANAS reported, 27 members of the Croatian PEN Center signed a petition requesting the resignation of the Croatian PEN's administrative committee. The petition stated that the resolution the committee had presented at the PEN Congress offered Croatian cultural cooperation to the "ideologists of the genocide of the Croatian people" and "identified the Serb executioner with the Croatian victim." The petition also stated that 150 members of the Croatian PEN Center had not been consulted about the resolution presented in Prague.

Renowned Croatian poet Vlado Gotovac, in an interview in the 26 December issue of the Split satirical weekly FERAL TRIBUNE, noted that some of the signatories of the petition were great names of Croatian literature. He expressed surprise that "several serious writers" could sign a petition that he called "one of the most shameful in Croatian literature." Gotovac said that what made it especially shameful was the fact that it had been signed freely, without any pressure. He added that he found it "unbelievable that dignity and truth have been abandoned in Croatian literature."

Viewing the discord in the Croatian PEN Center, the 27 December issue of the Split daily SLOBODNA DALMACIJA observed that in Croatian literary and intellectual circles the "civil war of opposing and irreconcilable options has already begun." The paper said that the tale of the PEN and the Prague resolution showed that all Croatian cultural institutions have been divided into "Tudjmanophiles and Tudjmanophobes."

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Handziski Seeks Closer Cooperation With Slovenia

AU0702150195 Skopje MIC in English 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], Defense Minister Blagoj Handziski yesterday received the first ambassador of the Republic of Slovenia to Macedonia Ms. Jozica Puhar. During the meeting, both sides expressed satisfaction with the mutual cooperation in the field of defense between the defense ministries of the two republics. At the same time, the two sides emphasized the need for strengthening and further specifying cooperation and need for an exchange of military attaches as soon as possible.

In the meeting, attention was also given to the issue of the political and security situation in the Balkans.

European Court Hearing on Greek Embargo Assessed

AU0702104695 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 4 Feb 95 p 13

[Commentary by Nevenka Mitrevska: "A Process Without Witnesses"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Luxembourg, within the inner circle of the European family, behind well-locked doors, a process is being carried out against Greece. The charges of the European Commission are presented before 13 distinguished judges of the European Court of Justice by six regular lawyers of the Court. They are trying to prove that the Greek blockade against the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is illegal and that by implementing by this one-sided act without consultation with and agreement of the other EU member countries, Greece practically closed one of the borders of the Union to the free circulation of people and goods, and so caused irreparable damage to the whole Union. The accused side, that is Greece, is defending itself with a whole army of 40 eminent lawyers who are experts and assistants for international law. Their task is to twist the whole process by claiming that the economic sanctions against Macedonia were applied by Greece to protect its national interests from the territorial and other threats and aspirations that are allegedly contained in the name, the flag, and the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. They are trying to prove that the economic blockade is a "political" counter-measure!

We have an unequal situation now, as was the case when the process started last spring—the only side that is affected, the Republic of Macedonia, is not represented in the Court in Luxembourg, not even as an observer. This fact reduces the whole process to its real value and meaning: The European Union charged Greece not because it had a high feeling for justice or a wish to protect the interests and stability of Macedonia, but primarily to protect its own interests and the foundations on which the insecure European "common spirit" is based upon. This was also clearly formulated by the European Commissioner Hans Van Der Brook at the beginning of the process last spring when he defended himself against the Greek accusation that he had taken the Macedonian side: "Violations of the European Agreement must be taken to court because otherwise we would allow the agreement to be disrespected.... We are not pointing a finger at Greece as the guilty party in the Macedonian-Greek dispute, we are just indicating that it is violating the European Agreement and that it is applying measures that cannot be a subject for negotiations."

At the beginning of the process, however, the European judges were not involved much in details such as the "violation of the European Agreement." It was important for them to define whether the closing of Macedonia's southern border by Greece was really producing "irreparable damages" in the European Union's trade with third countries, as was noted in the charges. "It does not," they decided, and they refused the request of the European Commission to force to Greece to lift the blockade against Macedonia immediately. A battle was lost, but not the whole war, as the representatives of the Commission in Brussels said, firmly believing that justice will finally be done.

Will it really be so? Information and statements after the first day of the continuation of the process are scarce and not too encouraging. The statement of the new president of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, attracted special attention, because in his opinion the arguments that were presented by Greece were "acceptable." Nevertheless, the Commission itself has its own arguments, according to some information, and, this time, the judges will give them more serious consideration.

It is absolutely ungrateful to try to anticipate the outcome of the process, that is the verdict, if there will be any verdict at all. It will be affected not only by justice and law, but also by the particular interests of the members countries, by the efforts of the Union aimed at safeguarding its image of unity in the eyes of the world, and by the wish to spare a member country, although it is Greece, from international disgrace.

However, there are two things that are certain. The first is that, regardless of the verdict—either favorable or unfavorable to Greece—it will have neither a direct nor an indirect influence on the situation and the difficulties in the Republic of Macedonia that have been caused by the southern blockade, because Papandreou has already informed that the blockade will continue even if the Court orders it to be lifting. The second certain thing is that, after the process, the European Union will no longer be what it used to be, or what it has pretended to be so far: If it does not condemn Greece, the European Court will legalize the illegal and violent attitude of the European Union's members against other countries—and why not—even against countries that are within the Union itself. If the verdict is against Greece and Greece does not respect it, Brussels will

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be dishonored. In both cases, the "irretrievable" processes of European integration will suffer a serious blow that can easily reverse them.

Of course, there is a third possibility, which would be in the interest of all interested sides, including Macedonia. Some Greek newspapers have already announced this by writing about Greece's alleged intention to undertake appropriate "actions" even before the verdict is reached; that it might lift the blockade itself in order to make the further process and the final verdict insignificant. Unfortunately, political reasoning and realism is needed for this, and Athens has not demonstrated any possession of these so far.

Minister Explains Revision of Judicial System

AU0302191195 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 2 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Lilica Kitanovska: "Major Revision in the Concept of Judicial System"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Expectations that the new parliament would readily pass the Law on Courts presented by the former government are today unfounded, although it is only a matter of voting. The Ministry of Justice, headed by Minister Vlado Popovski, has its own opinions about this law and the whole area it governs. As a result the draft will be changed considerably and returned to the commissions for further discussion. All this has pulled the whole matter back from the voting stage. The new text is still in preparation and there will probably be at least one more meeting of the expert commission, but since most of the material has been adopted, the minister explains some of the provisions:

The commission, consisting of twenty experts, has already had four meetings. The first major change we made together was in the structure of the law. We do not start now with organization and responsibility, but with general principles that define the position of the courts in terms of the separation of powers. We talk about access to justice and giving justice. Decisions in law are defined as is also the meaning of them for other state bodies and so on. All this has the character of a kind of a constitutional law on the judicial system. There is a separate chapter on judges, juries, and related issues. We deal with the issue of the material and physical safety of judges. A new feature is the court police. They are responsible for the safety of the judges and will be provided in the courts and in their surroundings. The court police have authority to secure the rooms in the court and the trials. The regular police are not admitted there except in special cases: If there is a general danger, for instance a fire, or if the president of the court calls them in a case where the court police are not able to prevent a criminal act. The safety of the judges outside the court is the same as the safety of the citizen, which is ensured by the regular police.

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We guarantee that judges will not be involved in business activities and are exempt from being a member of a political party. We also believe that their salaries should be the highest in the administration. As for the status of the courts, we quarantee a special budget in the administration. It would be implemented through the Ministry of Justice, not the Ministry of Finance. We would thus become fully independent and avoid a situation in which the administration might influence the courts. This is the first current area that should see some change and be followed by an end to undignified relations. Up to now, a financial administrator was "the master" of the judges. This was a sign that the courts were held in low esteem and marginalized. The judicial system is the backbone of a state and it is valuable if the financial element is emphasized. Court fees and court deposits are expected to be a source of revenue, because the court is not only a consumer but it "generates" big money for the budget. Moreover, an amendment and and an annex to the regulations on court fees is under preparation, because we can no longer tolerate a situation in which court proceedings costs five to seven denars and to have one person in charge of 50 sets of proceedings, as was the case in Delcevo. [passage indistinct]

Standardization of Punishments

Probably the most interesting question involves the organization of the courts. We have already discussed this and we shall not go back to it. Two opinions have crystallized, of which one is more likely to be adopted, that is, an integrated organization and network of courts. Three levels of courts are envisaged—basic, appellate, and supreme. No other regular courts are envisaged. There were alternatives advocated by judges of the commercial court system, that is, that we should provide for other courts as well. However, the working group did not support this idea. The explanation was that it was necessary to have a clear and strict pyramid in the judiciary. If we agreed to have other regular courts, they would be extra activities of the Supreme Court. Let us recall that commercial courts were formed under socialism and within the framework of Yugoslavia. Their structure was as follows: District commercial courts, higher commercial courts at the level of the republic, and the supreme commercial court in Belgrade. After the loosening of centralism in former Yugoslavia the last was abolished and the higher courts in the republics remained at the top of the pyramid, connected to the Supreme Court only in making revisions. If they were to be separated now, it would mean that they would be outside the structure. The second argument for this is of a professional nature. Criminal commercial acts belong to legislature. Everything else involves civil acts or obligations. This removes the foundation for such specialized courts. They existed in the past because state property was privileged. The disputes were among subjects of the same status that worked with state property resources and the resources were transferred from one

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pocket to the other. The state company would then go to the bank and get credit to save itself.... Since there is a change in the object that is being protected now, there is no reason for a different regime of protection. Second, since there is an increasing number of disputes between private subjects and fewer mixed subjects, there is a need for an integrated regime of protection. Third, there has been a sharp reduction in so-called commercial disputes. The financial means now cannot be provided with a simple signature or letter of credit, but there are mortgages and other concrete forms that are expressed in the executive procedure itself, rather than through disputes.

Basic and "More Basic" Courts

Regarding the system for misdemeanors, it has been now defined for the first time that misdemeanors differ from other violations only in duration and not form. The verdict is reached in regular court proceedings by qualified lawyers and there is no doubt that these are a matter for the regular courts, too. There is some resistance to this, probably because of a certain psychological difficulty associated with some definitions about the "level," and this is inconsistent.

Nevertheless, there is a real dilemma about the concept that "won." Will all basic courts have general competence? There is a proposal for 13 courts that handle a larger number of disputes to be structured with specialist departments, for instance a civil department, and that the same should apply to misdemeanors. The other idea is to have all courts, regardless of the population of the town or number of judges, responsible for all subjects. This is something to be decided by the Ministry or the minister. There are arguments in favor of both, but there cannot be a true reform if the broader competence remains in the hands of Skopje, Bitola, and Stip. It is more acceptable if a larger number of courts are encompassed. However, we could find ourselves with a situation in which we have basic courts and others that are "more basic," where all are equal, but some are "more equal." We believe that the principle of specialization is of great importance because it encourages quality and increases independence and impartiality. If this principle is pursued consistently then the question arises whether a judge can be transferred from one department to another. The president will not be transferred from one subject to another, and in this way influence on the independence in reaching a verdict will be prevented. We have solved this issue with other instruments, too. Thus we confine the president to the maximum by having annual schedules nominating the judges according to the specialities and possibilities of the court. There were some questions about whether the judges should be elected to particular court departments or to the court as a whole, but we concluded that in this stage we should elect them to the court, while the mechanisms that we mentioned should be applied after the elections.

The judicial administration is something that needs review, after which the commission's work would be completed and the draft presented to the government. On the other hand, there are no dilemmas about one extremely politicized question, that is, the existence of a higher court in Gostivar. We believe that there is no need for more than three higher courts in the country. The representation of the ethnic groups in the judicial system will be determined by the personnel of the courts, and in doing this everybody has equal chances. This is how Popovski concluded.

Commentator Foresees Changes to Constitution

AU0702133195 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 4 Feb 95 p 16

[Commentary by Zorica Darkovska: "Are There Preparations for a Package of Constitutional Changes?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Not everyone has the possibility of being an active participant in the events that enter the history of a country, as was the case with the former parliament of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. Apart from the long list of matters that have not been completed yet, the former members of parliament, among the rest, adopted the Macedonian Constitution in 1991. Before two months had passed, they also proclaimed changes to the Constitution.

The present members of parliament cannot count on the possibility of adopting a constitution, but they should be ready for constitutional changes by now. It is clear that this will happen very soon, but what the changes to the present Constitution will be is uncertain. There were many requests for changes in the years after the "Law of the laws" was adopted; there were various initiatives and wishes, and many "failures." It will come as no surprise if a whole packet of proposals for changes to the Constitution is presented to this parliament. If we know that the people who have the power to decide on what and when something will be presented as a subject for discussion are disposed to remove some of the weaknesses of the Constitution, we can suppose that summing up and selection is underway out on what must, may, or should be changed (and why). Of course, some matters must first be clarified before a historical decision is taken.

Classification

Let us recall some of the changes that have been requested so far. There was a general feeling that some of the constitutional decisions were pushed too strongly, thus twisting our parliamentary democracy in which the majority decision is passed with over half of the votes. Our definitions require a two-thirds majority for an enormously long list of laws that can be passed with at least 80 votes. In other parliamentary democracies, whose positive experiences we are trying to follow, such a majority is required only for acts that have the strength of a Constitution. When these solutions were in preparation—according to which, for instance, less votes are needed the formation of a government than for the law on courts or

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for court procedures—the idea was that these laws (they were all supported in the Census '80) should obtain greater legitimacy. The outcome was that they did not get any legitimacy, because it was impossible to obtain a two-thirds majority in the former parliament, and the laws were not passed. Now, we have a different situation, but if we approach matters in a more principled way, whatever was an obstacle or a blockade in the work of the parliament should be eliminated.

There had been many discussions about the insufficient constitutional classification of the three authorities in the state—the legislative, executive, and still uncompleted judiciary powers. In the practice of the government and the Assembly, responsibilities were often intermingled, but the legislative power took precedence over the executive power in many cases. There were also loud discussions in which many persons who were competent in the law spoke about a violation of the balance in authority. They referred to the uncompleted constitutional regulations according to which it was possible for the Macedonian Assembly to take a vote of no-confidence in the government although it does not elect it, while the Assembly could not be dismissed by anyone. We know that there were situations when it was more than necessary for the former parliament to be dismissed, particularly when the work was fully blocked, when early elections were requested, and when nothing happened at all. There is still no one who can dismiss the Assembly, even if it deserves to be dismissed.

Terms

It seems that it is not yet clear how long someone can be held in custody. Our Constitution anticipates a period of up to 90 days, and this was considered a good regulation, although it was different from any other country's solution. It was remarkable that the Constitution provided for a prolongation of this term, which was explained in various ways—mainly on the foundations of the legal regulations that provided for prolonged custody.

There were calls for some seemingly cosmetic changes to the Constitution, such as the name of one of the state institutions, the Republican Court Council. The proposal was to avoid the word "Republican" because of associations with the former status of our state; within the framework of a federation.

There is another factor that presses for expeditious constitutional changes: regarding the Serbs and the Constitution. An agreement was signed two and a half years ago by the minister of the police, Ljubomir Frckovski, by Geert Ahrens, who aws responsible for ethnic questions at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and by the president of the Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia, Boro Ristic. The term is due to expire in February and, in the meantime, we were assured that this will happen after Frckovski gave a statement about the law on identity cards, in which he explained that the names of the Serbs in Macedonia will be in their original Serbian spelling although they have not been mentioned in the Constitution yet.

Then there are the requests of the Albanians in Macedonia. These were the most numerous. They started with initiatives by which they would become a constitutional nation in the Macedonian state, and now they are perpetrating unconstitutional activities regarding the opening of the so-called Albanian University in Tetovo. Will this high institution be approved constitutionally? What will become of the request of the Albanians in Macedonia is a question without an answer at this moment, but it does not mean that it will remain so for very long.

If we remember the statements by Stojan Andov at the end of his previous mandate—in which he said that if the general conditions for amendments to the Constitution were created, then they would have to be used at once—then we shall not have to wait for very long. The conditions have been created, the Commission for Constitutional Questions of the Macedonian Assembly has been formed and Andov is chairman of the Commission and of the Assembly again. It is now time for the second round of changes to the Constitution—after the completion of the first round in which Articles 3 and 49 were changed because of the need to emphasize Macedonia's rejection of any territorial claims against the neighboring countries, the stance that the borders can only be changed in accordance with the principle of good will and in accordance with the international norms, and that Macedonia will not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states and their internal affairs.

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Thaler, Hungary's Kovacs Sign Pact, Assess Talks

AU0602165795 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 6 Feb 95

[Report by Ernest Ruzic from Budapest]

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Ministers Thaler and Kovacs, following exhaustive talks, have signed a protocol on Slovenia's succession to agreements signed between Hungary and the former Yugoslavia. They assessed the talks as very good, as there are no unresolved issues between Slovenia and Hungary.

Both Slovenia and Hungary are striving to become part of European integration processes. These processes are, on a larger scale, the European Union and NATO, and on a smaller scale regional contacts within the Alpe-Adria Association and Slovenia's participation in the Visegrad Group. Because Hungary maintains good relations with Slovenia and Italy alike, it will not meddle in their negotiations, Minister Kovacs said.

The partners to the talks devoted great attention to the strengthening of economic relations on the basis of the free trade agreement. They also urged more modern transportation links and an improvement of the situation at the Dolga Vas-Redics border crossing.

Ministers Thaler and Kovacs also spoke of minority issues. The Slovene minister said that a mixed commission would work out an agreement on the assertion of minority rights in Ljubljana. He also announced future talks between Prime Ministers Drnovsek and Horn in Ljubljana, as well as a meeting of the presidents of the Central European countries here in Budapest.

Asked his opinion about the resolution of the crisis in the Balkans, Thaler said that Slovenia had cautioned early on about how the situation would develop if the international community failed to intervene in a timely way. Slovenia's interest is in establishing a lasting peace on a principled basis. For this reason, Slovenia supports the Contact Group peace plan.

Thaler Interviewed

AU0802084195 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 7 Feb 95 p 3

[Interview with Slovene Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler by Edit Melykuti Nagy; place and date not given: "Warming-Up Is Expected in the Adriatic Region"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Nagy] If there was a negotiation geography, Budapest would be placed between Zagreb and Rome. Slovenia must clarify serious unsolved issues with Croatia and Italy, while both sides regard Hungarian-Slovene relations as exemplary. Have your talks in Budapest confirmed this?

[Thaler] There is a symbolic importance to the fact that the second official trip after my appointment took me to Budapest, only 10 days after my visit to Zagreb. I consider Hungarian-Slovene relations to be extremely positive and, with this quick visit, I wanted to give further impetus to this exemplary cooperation. On my visit to Rome (on 7 February), I would like to find out the approach of the new Italian Government regarding Slovenia. We experienced some positive signs in the new year, signs that make us think that Italy has also realized that bilateral relations are not the same as multilateral relations. Because of the unsolved issues of our bilateral relations, the previous Italian Government caused a blockade of Slovenia's multilateral relations. This is why the process of our integration into Europe stopped temporarily. If the new Italian Government is ready to separate the various cooperation levels, this might also encourage our bilateral relations.

[Nagy] Separating from the former Yugoslavia was rather painful for Slovenia: Legal succession debates and unsolved border issues with Croatia topped your economic losses incurred by the loss of markets. Did your recent visit to Zagreb bring any change in this respect?

[Thaler] The Slovene people support independence even more now. According to opinion polls, many more people would now vote in favor of separating from Yugoslavia than during the referendum held in 1990. From an economic viewpoint, we have practically overcome the difficulties incurred by the separation; it is a fact, however, that there are debates on the legal succession. There have been such debates for the past four years, and the fact that Croatia was busy with more serious problems because of the war also contributed to this delay. However, I expect an improvement in this respect on the basis of my talks with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic. I think that Croatia is also ready for a compromise. We have set up a negotiation schedule and, in my opinion, we will reach an agreement soon. This would be a big relief for us, because we could start dealing with other issues.

[Nagy] Does Slovenia fear the outbreak of another Serbian-Croatian war?

[Thaler] It is in our interest to make sure that no such war breaks out, and we are conducting preventive political-diplomatic activity in order to avoid the renewal of this crisis. Therefore, we are concerned over Croatia's refusal to extend the UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force] mandate. We understand Zagreb's reasons, which the peace plan should also honor, but it is a fact that incidents might occur after the departure of the UN troops, and the crisis zone might even become wider. Therefore, we are trying to constantly focus the attention of international public opinion on this problem.

[Nagy] Many people regard you as a "tougher fighter" than your predecessor, and they say that you will be less compromising in the Slovene-Italian and Slovene-Croatian debates.

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[Thaler] It is true that the media mention Thaler as a "hawk" and my acquaintances keep wondering why. I do not deny, however, that I also accept this name when we are talking about Slovenia's vital interests. In my defense, let me tell you that the name of my state secretary is Golob, which means dove, so we are not such a bad combination after all.

Kucan Urges Urgent Creation of 'National Policy'

AU0702180395 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 7 Feb 95

[Statement by Slovene President Milan Kucan following a meeting with representatives of the Slovene minority in Austria, Italy, and Hungary in Ljubljana on 7 February—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The meeting with Slovene minorities in the neighboring countries has become something of a tradition. It was merely moved from the earlier New Year date to one that is closer to Slovene Culture Day—the most important holiday for the Slovenes, bearing in mind that the Slovene nation had constituted and integrated itself through culture and, in this manner, also gained an opportunity to constitute itself politically into a state that now has the responsibility and right to keep watch over the position and rights of its minorities in the countries where they live.

Last week, representatives of all the minorities, with the exception of Austria, held talks with Foreign Minister Thaler. All these talks have formed a unity. It would not be right to assume that something catastrophic is happening on this basis. However, certain matters are definitely not resolved, and Slovenia cannot help but show concern and responsibility, especially for everything that is happening to the minority in Slovenia. [sentence as heard]

When I say that these meetings have become traditional, I want to emphasize that they have not become inert; the contents of these talks are important. Today's talks again demonstrated that Slovenia urgently needs a well thought-out national policy, and within this framework, well thought-out contents for the Slovene minority policy. Slovenia must think about these in light of the changes that have taken place and are still taking place in Europe, which do not have one single meaning and which, unfortunately, do not entirely support our expectations about the future Europe as a unity of equal countries and nations, but, on the contrary, suggest that other options might also be possible.

Within this framework, we must, of course, also establish whether minorities are a desired or perhaps disturbing factor in the current inter-European relations, in relations between the European countries that are still based on the concept of a national state rather than a civic state. For this reason, it is often illusionary to talk about minorities as bridges that link nations and countries—as they are often a bone of contention.

Bogataj Interviewed About New Defense Law

AU0802073095 Ljubljana SLOVENSKA VOJSKA in Slovene 13 Jan 95 p 6

[Interview with government adviser Miran Bogataj by Tanja Pecnik; place and date not given: "The Defense Law Brings Changes and at the Same Time Assures Continuity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Pecnik] The State Chamber of the Republic of Slovenia at its last session passed a systemic Defense Law that regulates the type, organization, and scope of the country's defense. Government adviser Miran Bogataj was involved in preparing the law from the very beginning. For this reason, we asked him to tell us about the law and the reasons for a long parliamentary procedure that preceded its adoption.

[Bogataj] Over the past year and a half, preparing this law was one of the most important projects that I dealt with. The legislative procedure lasted equally long—until mid-1993. Usually, legislative procedures in our parliament last a little less than a year (from six to eight months). It transpired in this case though that the Defense Law was a more demanding project. Its taxing nature was first manifested in the fact that it had to win a special two-thirds majority of all deputies present in the parliament, as stipulated by the Constitution. Second, an extremely high degree of consensus had to be reached among the parties regarding the solutions proposed. These solutions had to safeguard the establishment of a defense system that would be comparable not merely with the countries of parliamentary democracy but would also suit the needs, characteristics, and possibilities of our young state. At the same time, we also had to assure continuity with the present development of the defense system and the defense role in general; radical cuts simply were not impossible.

[Pecnik] Which issues of the law posed the biggest "stumbling block"—that is, the subject of the most stormy debates?

[Bogataj] There were relatively numerous debates. However, if I were to divide them into groups, then these would be the following: The first is the role of the intelligence-security service of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia [VOMO]. There were various attempts and ideas in the sense that this service did not need any special authorities, that this service was not necessary, and so forth. Especially polemical was the debate about the intelligence function of this service, although this service precisely is a component of any general staff and without it, one cannot imagine successful work of any army in the world. The current system, voted by the parliament, regulates the intelligence activity rather adequately, while the counterintelligence activity is very much limited and restrained exclusively to the defense forces—that is, the army and the ministry. The police powers, which this service held in this sphere according the earlier 1991 Law on Defense

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and Protection, have been limited considerably with the new law. They are defined with the new law on penal proceedings, which restricts them to Chapter 27 of the Law on Penal Proceedings of the Republic of Slovenia to certain authorities pertaining to the detention of a perpetrator of a criminal act on the territory of a military object.

The second group of debates revolved around the separation of incumbencies between the legislative and executive authorities. The jurisdiction is excluded here because we decided back in 1991 against special judicial offices in the defense sphere and that the regular, civilian judicial bodies be entirely responsible for the defense sphere. The law was drafted and proposed in such a way, and we even tried to steer the entire debate in this direction, that the separation of incumbencies between the executive and the legislative authorities would be as complete as possible. Some saw a problem in the fact that our Constitution stipulates that the president of the state is the supreme commander of the armed forces. This would, in their opinion, mean that the president of the state as the supreme commander interferes directly and heads the entire hierarchy of management and commanding in the army. This is not possible, of course, and we explained it in public on numerous occasions that such solutions are typical for presidential systems. It is also characteristic of all comparable military organizations in Europe that the president has certain authorities, which, however, are more of a representative nature, not involving actual authorities over the army. A military organization is operated and managed by the government and the incumbent minister. The military commanding itself falls within the responsibility of the highest military rank; That is, the general staff commander or, as is the case in Austria, the inspector general.

The third group of polemics concerned the scope of the law and its internal structure. The former concept of the Slovene People's Defense is still very much present in Slovenia, especially in certain organizations, and this was mirrored in various demands as to what the law should include. The passed law is rational and rests on a premise that the defense of the state is the state's responsibility. All other solutions are subordinated to this.

These are, therefore, the three groups of issues where the swords crossed the most. However, a whole string of other issues also arose.

[Pecnik] What did we gain with the law?

[Bogataj] In 1991 we passed the Law on Defense and Protection and the Law on Military Service with the ambition to regulate the defense role of the independent state, simultaneously acknowledging the fact that Slovenia was still a part of the former Yugoslavia. We were, thus, aware that this was a law with a limited shelf life and could only regulate matters during a sort of transitional period. The same year, especially while we were directly involved in gaining independence, we simultaneously diluted the Law on Defense and Protection considerably with numerous constitutional amendments and particularly constitutional laws. For this reason, one of the priority tasks of our ministry was to regulate the defense with a systemic law and regulate methodically the second component that would over a longer transitional period also fall within its realm. I am talking about protection from other natural disasters.

On this basis, we started preparing systemic solutions in both spheres. Prior to this run another process that was supposed to lead to the preparation and passing of subsequent legal acts—namely, the passing of a resolution on guidelines of the national security concept. This was a document with which we were supposed to acquire a general State Chamber stance toward the concept of national security. Following the debates that took place in 1992 and 1993, only the resolution on the guidelines of the national security concept was passed. The resolution served as one of the foundations for the preparation of a systemic defense law and, on the other hand, also for the legislative regulation of protection from natural and other disasters. Timewise, we were the most successful in this other sphere. The State Chamber passed laws on the Red Cross, protection from fires, fire brigade service, and in autumn 1994, an umbrella Law on Protection from Natural and Other Disasters.

On the other hand, there is the Defense Law, which regulates only the defense component. We, thus, took a new step in differentiating between the defense and protection components. If the Law on Defense and Protection is still envisaged—that is, linked to these two functions—then this division has now been completed with the systemic legislation. We have separate laws for protection from natural and other disasters and a separate law for the defense system. The Defense Law will be followed by changes in the Law on Military Service. In this way, the defense sphere will be legally regulated if we disregard numerous sublegal acts and regulations that are still to follow.

The Defense Law first of all means choice and definition of the bases of organization of the entire defense system. It regulates the military, as well as the civilian defense. Within the limits of the military defense, the law also regulates fundamental questions pertaining to the organization and relations within the military organization. Within the limits of civilian defense, the law defines the extent, type, and authorities of its executors. The law devotes relatively much attention to defense measures and the entire system of management and supervision of the defense role, it defines the authorities of the parliament, the government, and so forth. In search of appropriate legal solutions for individual fields, we modeled ourselves on some solution contained in the laws of certain West European countries, especially the Italian and Austrian solutions. Of course, a simple transfer of these solutions was not possible. Namely, in defining the defense role, one has to take into consideration actual

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circumstances in a given country. One of the fundamental differences between ourselves and other West European states is that our military defense is in many ways dependent on the organization of preparations in the civilian defense. Our military organization is not classical but adapted to suit the size, possibilities, and characteristics of our country. Here I primarily have in mind the logistic support, which is rather limited in our military organization. The entire system of material and medical supply is based on civilian defense. In war conditions, this is provided through the offices of authority, companies, institutions, and other organizations.

The law also regulates the status of employees in the defense sphere. It introduces new solutions for recruiting in the ranks of the peacetime contingent. I believe that this part of the law is extremely important for the further establishment and development of the entire military organization in Slovenia.

[Pecnik] How does the law define the incumbencies between the Defense Ministry and the General Staff of the Slovene Army?

[Bogataj] The Defense Ministry, as one of the government departments, primarily manages the army. The minister is the one who issues all acts, regulations, and so forth with which the entire military organization is created, regulated, and directed. However, commanding military activity falls within the responsibility of the general staff commander and the officers subordinated to him, following the principle of one rank one officer, subordination, and mandatory execution of orders. The general staff commander also proposes the appointment of commanders, promotions, and similar to the minister. At the defense minister's proposal, the General Staff commander is appointed by the government. The General Staff is otherwise an organ within the ministry's structure. The law, therefore, defines very clearly the relationship between the ministry and the General Staff commander.

Through the organization of the Defense Ministry and its organizational units, the minister also safeguards the logistic support and performance of administrative and expert duties for the requirements of the entire Slovene Army.

[Pecnik] One of the law's articles regulates the labor relations for those serving in the military.

[Bogataj] A part of the law forms the provisions that regulate status issues of the people employed in the defense sphere. On one hand there is an administrative expert sphere, which is especially important because as of 1 January 1995, the Defense Ministry took over all hitherto municipal administrative offices in charge of defense matters. With this, the administrative and expert organization has been rounded up and placed entirely under the responsibility of the Defense Ministry. On the other hand, these provisions regulate status questions of the employees in the peacetime contingent—that is, the professional part of the army. The majority of military organizations aspire toward as great as possible professionalization of the peacetime contingent. This is also extremely topical for us, because our soldiers serve the shortest military service in Europe, while at the same time our military organization requires that certain duties in the functioning of the most demanding systems be performed by professionals. The basic solution brought about with the law is similar to those known from other armies—that is, other countries—namely, recruiting, i.e. employment, is realized on the basis of an employment contract. For soldiers, the period is five years and for noncommissioned officers and officers 10 years. Each has the right to extend his contract afterward. An upper age limit has also been set; this is 45 for soldiers and 55 for noncommissioned officers. A new solution has also being instituted, which facilitates to an employee who under certain conditions terminated military service to be retrained for a civilian profession and in the period following the expiry of the contract enjoy certain privileges; this period must not exceed two years.

The law also defines military training. This does not involve a classical military education, a military academy, and so forth. We stand on a premise that a classical military education system would not be applicable to such a small military organization. For this reason, the law demands previous general education (secondary or higher) from its permanent contingent—that is, from a candidate who wishes to work in the permanent contingent, while he gains the appropriate functional knowledge for the work in the military organization in our military schools. The law also envisages the possibility to train officer cadres in regular academy education. With this system we wish to avoid concentration of old or narrowly specialized military cadres at a certain high hierarchical level, whom the military organization would not be able to utilize actively and rationally. For this reason, we wish to set up a system that will facilitate a relatively easy transition from a military into a civilian profession and vice versa.

One of the things that will happen immediately after the implementation of the law is that all permanently employed staff will as of that date be treated as contract employees in accordance with the legally prescribed deadlines. Therefore, we will not have two categories of employees—those employed before the passing of the law and those who joined the military after the implementation of the law.

[Pecnik] Do you fear that because of such a system the interest in military jobs will decline?

[Bogataj] I believe that there are no reasons for this. It is true, however, that Slovenia suffers certain cadre limitations in the military sphere. This has been particularly noticeable in the hitherto development when we were forced to get the military organization "on its feet"

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literally overnight. Slovenia's short-term cadre possibilities will be limited, bearing in mind the size of its active male and female population.

One must say that the law contains several solutions that stimulate employment in the army, ranging from grants and ample employment opportunities to material incentives and so forth.

One of the problems that we did not manage to resolve with the law is the enhancement of the pension insurance by increased or additional insurance. This remains as regulated before in the Law on Defense and Protection. The reason for it lies in the principled stance of the State Chamber: The concept of the pension insurance is unique in a way. It was developed in the eastern block, or rather the former Yugoslavia, and from there transferred to our system. Other western countries know the institution of additional insurance for those professions that are, because of its uniqueness, difficulty, or other special demands, significantly different from other professions.

Bills that solve the issue of pension insurance with an increase are abundant; however, solutions differ from law to law. For this reason, the State Chamber has decided in favor of unified legal solutions, and for this reason would not allow the passing of any new law that would again reintroduce these concepts in a given sphere. If a solution is passed in this field in the future and the concept of additional insurance will be regulated legally, then we will definitely pursue this option for employment in the defense sphere, primarily for operative posts in military commands, units, and institutions.

[Pecnik] How does the law regulate labor relations for other Defense Ministry employees?

[Bogataj] For other ministry employees, and this partially also applies to the members of the Slovene Army peacetime contingent, labor relations are determined according to the regulations that apply to state administration employees. Certain specifics and the meeting of certain special criteria are taken into account here. One of them, which is new and was not contained in the first legal solution, is that only Slovene citizens may work in the defense sphere. The law also limits the right to strike, certain posts can be filled without a public advertisement, and so forth. Of course, just as in all security spheres (in general) there are several legal provisions that apply to the work in special conditions—work outside working hours, permanent availability, and suchlike—and also apply to our department. Regulations that determine pay supplements for work in defense have remained unchanged compared with the unified solution mentioned earlier.

[Pecnik] What will change with the renaming of the Territorial Defense to the Slovene Army?

[Bogataj] The renaming actually took place with the passing of the Law on Spheres of Activity and Organization the Ministries. The Slovene Army General Staff was established on that occasion. The actual, essential transition and not a mere change of name is defined in the Defense Law. It involves a transition from the Territorial Defense as an armed formation limited to a certain region to a classic military organization. Even though the Slovene Army also has a territorial component, it is actually an army of an autonomous, independent, and sovereign state and not a regionally confined army. The military organization will have to be capable of carrying out all the functions, forms, and strategies of military defense. The capacities of the hitherto Territorial Defense to a great extent departed from what the Territorial Defense used to be for—defense of auxiliary lines, military control of a given region, and so forth.

The appearance of the Defense Law, that is, the second phase in the setting up of the military organization means implementing the law that secures funds for the fundamental development programs of the Republic of Slovenia by the year 2003, which was passed at the beginning of last year and is already being implemented.

The renaming also means an entirely different role of the General Staff—a considerable widening of its functions and tasks and also an upgrading of the military organization. Certain services and branches that have not yet been developed will assume their places and roles within the military organization with the new law. The Slovene Army must be comparable to Western military organizations. It is precisely the second phase of establishing the military organization that is now our fundamental task and potentially also one of the most difficult tasks of the Defense Ministry.

[Pecnik] The law also regulates civilian supervision over the army and the ministry's work in general?

[Bogataj] The systemic Defense Law outlines very precisely the authorities of the State Chamber and its advisory bodies regarding the functioning and supervision of the entire military organization, or, generally speaking, the entire defense system of the country. From this point of view, one of the important provisions is also that members of the armed forces can in military affairs turn to the human rights' ombudsman if they believe that these are being violated. The right to object exists within the military organization, and so forth. International conventions that refer to this area have also been taken into account.

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Federal

Russian Promises Deliveries Despite Sanctions

LD0702133095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1234 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 7 Feb (TANJUG)—Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Oleg Davydov told TANJUG today that Russia was ready to deliver kerosene to Yugoslavia and that it would find a way of doing so should the Sanctions Committee fail to grant its permission.

"But, should the Sanctions Committee fail to accept our decision, the only way out for us would be to leave the committee, or to find a way of carrying out those deliveries", Davydov said.

On several occasions last year Yugoslavia sought deliveries of natural gas and some other fuels for humanitarian needs.

In addition, three months ago when the sanctions were partially lifted, Djordje Siradovic, federal minister of trade, sent a letter to Deputy Prime Minister Davydov asking for a delivery of 27,000 tonnes of kerosene for JAT and other airlines, including Aeroflot, that fly to Belgrade airport.

Following a meeting with Federal Minister of Trade Siradovic today, the Russian deputy prime minister made a brief statement for TANJUG in reply to a question what the most important novelty in economic cooperation between the two countries would be.

"Today we had talks about the fact that the main streamline in our foreign trade cooperation ought to be the removal of all obstacles. This can be achieved by completely liberating our trade, by creating a free trade zone between Russia and Yugoslavia", Davydov said.

"If Serbia is ready, we are prepared to initiate the examination of that issue", Davydov said concluding that the good tradition in economic cooperation should be further developed.

The Russian deputy prime minister is at the head of an official delegation which has been paying a visit to Yugoslavia at the invitation of the federal government.

Until the sanctions were clamped down on Yugoslavia in 1992 the two countries exchanged goods to the tune of $1.093 billion, out of which Yugoslav exports were $530 million.

Gas Pact Signed

LD0702215995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2122 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 7 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav and Russian Government officials in Belgrade on Tuesday signed an agreement on Russia's natural gas deliveries to Yugoslavia until the year 2010.

The agreement was signed by Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Nikola Sainovic and Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Trade Minister Oleg Davydov, in the presence of about 50 Yugoslav and Russian officials and economists.

Following the signing of the agreement, Davydov briefed the press that the basic goal of the talks with Yugoslav officials was to define legal ground for resumed cooperation between the two countries once the sanctions against Yugoslavia were lifted.

Davydov said, 'We have exchanged with our hosts the views on various topics ranging from agriculture to the oil industry.'

Davydov said this was a third agreement signed by Russia and Yugoslavia in six months. The two other agreements were signed last August during Sainovic and Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic's visit to Moscow.

Addressing the Russian officials, Sainovic said the talks between the two countries' officials were a big step ahead in promoting bilateral relations. Sainovic said, 'the agreement we signed today confirms the two governments' commitment to the full engagement in promoting our relations.'

Sainovic said the Yugoslav and Russian delegations worked divided into ten working groups, and said [words indistinct] proposals and ways of speeding up economic cooperation between the two countries had come up at the meetings of these groups.

Asked by the press to comment on the sanctions against Yugoslavia, Davydov said the sanctions were antihumanitarian in their own right and did not reflect the two peoples' wish to continue cooperation. Davydov criticized the U.N. Sanctions Committee for being deliberately slow in issuing a permit to Russia for supplying Yugoslavia with 130,000,000 cubic meters of natural gas for humanitarian purposes.

Yugoslav trade Minister Djordje Siradovic said once the sanctions against Yugoslavia were lifted, the agreement signed Tuesday between the two countries and the setting up of an inter-government committee would constitute the framework of broad-based and intensive economic cooperation.

Siradovic and Davydov exchanged views on the setting up of a free-trade zone between Yugoslavia and the Russian Federation and of its introduction into other Balkan countries as well.

Davydov said the Russian Government was willing to meet requests by Yugoslav Airlines and Aviogenex and deliver 27,000 tonnes of kerosine for their needs as well as for the needs of foreign airline companies flying to Belgrade. Davydov said that an amount of kerosine had

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already been set aside and would be delivered to Yugoslavia even if the U.N. Sanctions Committee again blocked the delivery.

Davydov said Yugoslavia would ask the Sanctions Committee for a permission to be delivered kerosine, and said Russia would leave the committee in case it refused to issue such a permit, in order to carry out the agreed deliveries.

In 1992, before the sanctions were imposed on Yugoslavia in late May for alleged involvement in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the exchange between the two countries totalled 1,093,000,000 dollars, of which Yugoslav import amounted to about 530,000,000 dollars.

The Russian Government delegation will leave Yugoslavia Tuesday.

Russians View Future

AU0702204595 Belgrade RTB Television Network lin Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 7 Feb 95

["Exclusive" statements by Oleg Davydov, Russian Federation deputy prime minister, and FRY Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic in Belgrade on 7 February; Davydov speaks in Russian with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Davydov] Contacts are being reestablished, as are exchanges of our experts and entrepreneurs; that is the most important issue today; the other important thing is that we are establishing a legal foundation for our cooperation with new countries, new economies; Russia has already switched from a centralized economy to a market economy and it is very important to have a comprehensive legal foundation for cooperation, both as regards the protection of investment and double taxation, and in other agreements.

Moreover, I believe that it is very important that we have given our consent for a large Yugoslav delegation to visit Russia in order to acquaint themselves with modern technology on the basis of which we can develop new cooperation, improve the competitive edge of our goods, both for Russia and Yugoslavia. We are ready to open our markets to Yugoslav entrepreneurs so that they can be more active and we are ready for a closer and mutually fruitful cooperation.

[Sainovic] This visit is immensely signific[illegible] for the further improvement of our relations because it has introduced numerous new, superior, and more stable elements into our cooperation. It reflects the continuity of our years-long relations and acknowledges the changes in both countries. What is most important is that it defines our long-term cooperation independently of the current, particularly foreign, pressures on both countries.

At the same time, the results of this visit are an invitation to other countries to start coordinating their relations with Yugoslavia in the same way, and it also gives businessmen of both countries the chance, in accordance with the agreements that we are in the process of signing and with numerous details of our work and the work of our 10 groups, thoroughly and independently, and in accordance with the market economy, to start improving relations among companies in the same way as we are establishing interstate relations. Therefore, in the next two months we should expect a new meeting at this level—between the two governments—the signing of new documents and the further establishment of our relations in the interest of our two states and peoples.

Jovanovic Wants Belgrade-Pale Joint Policy

LD0802150895 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1411 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Valjevo, 8 Feb (TANJUG)—Vladislav Jovanovic, federal minister of foreign affairs, said today that it was very important to bring about the unity of the Serb nation and to renew joint Pale-Belgrade policymaking.

"Our brothers in Bosnia-Herzegovina should make an effort; they should finally come to terms with reality and organize joint policymaking with us, so we can defend more easily and in a better way the legitimate interests of the entire Serb nation," Jovanovic told Radio-Valjevo.

Once we are recognized and accepted as equal partners in negotiations, it will be possible to discuss all proposals including French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe's proposal, which was adopted by the EU, Jovanovic said.

Commentary: Trying To Turn Back 'Tide of Defeat'

AU0702182495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Feb 95

[Announcer-read commentary]

[FBIS Translated Text] The crossing of some 20 aggressor helicopters from Serbia to eastern Bosnia is a serious violation of the flight exclusion zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina and one of the most serious violations of the blockade of the border on the Drina. What has forced Milosevic's regime to take such a risky move and gamble with the chance of easing of the sanctions and gradually returning Serbia from isolation?

The decision was made following an expert analysis by the military headquarters in Belgrade, which revealed that the existing aggressor's forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina were not capable of holding the temporarily occupied territories.

What is more, total chaos is reigning along some of the front lines. A war that, instead of the promised two weeks, has already been going on for almost three years, the fear of the international war crimes tribunal, and the split between Milosevic and Karadzic have had a devastating effect on their soldiers' morale. A major new problem emerged when recruits who had refused to be

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mobilized and had therefore spent time in prison or at the inhuman reeducation center in Manjaca joined their units at the front. These young men, who resemble robots more than human beings, find that death is frequently their only release. That is why, at the height of the fighting, they have been rushing into no-man's land and waiting impassively for death to claim them. Every death of this kind has driven other aggressor soldiers insane, including those whom the great Serbian propaganda campaign had definitely made into willing cannon fodder.

The analysis conducted by the leading military experts of the so-called Yugoslav Army gave top marks to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, particularly following the collapse of the greatest offensive by the aggressor's forces from three states against the Bihac region, which led to panic. The Serbian regime has played all its cards on the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina and has paid an enormous price for it. Now there is the danger that Karadzic's gang might fritter away all its gains. That is why new officers have been sent to Bosnia—apart from the 1,500 who are already on Belgrade's payroll. New military hardware has also been sent, as well as reinforcements for the weakest places in the aggressor's positions. All this, however, is in vain since the front line has been breached in a hundred places and will inevitably disintegrate.

One should add that Hitler, too, conducted similar undertakings at the end of the Second World War. He sent more military hardware and reinforcements to his troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to his satellites—the Ustasha and the Chetniks—but to no avail. The fascists managed to get away with a couple of counteroffensives and an occasional breakthrough into the free territory, but they never managed to turn back the tide of defeat.

FRY Military Budget Does Not Meet Needs

95P20431A Podgorica POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Jan 95 p 9

[Article by V. Bozovic "Savings Also Affect Military"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Financing for the Yugoslav Army for this year has been increased by 26 percent compared to last year, but the increase will only cover the most urgent needs. How to keep pace with scientific achievements of other countries?

At the end of last year, in December, both councils of the Federal Assembly approved the Federal budget. The major part, 76.2 percent, of the budget was allocated for the Yugoslav Army. This amounts to 1.611 billion dinars and exceeds the last year's allocation by 334 million dinars, or 26.2 percent.

Federal Minister of Defense Pavle Bulatovic pointed out several times that this will cover only minimal needs. The amount requested for the military was 2.465 billion. Thus, the shortage is 854 million. According to Minister Bulatovic, the limited budget has created a situation in which most of the money is spent for the individual salaries of the professional military, for quartermaster and health needs, for training, and for basic technical maintenance.

Obviously, there will be no money for other objectives. Thus a logical question arises whether the Yugoslav Army will be able to keep pace with the scientific developments in the military doctrines of the world. Another question is how to continue implementing the planned reforms which started last year.

A major problem is also the low income of the professional members of the Yugoslav Army, the suddenly increasing number of resignations of primarily younger professional people and the top scientific workers whose education and specialization require decades of work. In addition there are unresolved problems of housing, the interruption of investments in scientific research and development, and the low level of acquisition of weapons and military equipment.

We know the military have to share the fate of their country and people, and obviously pining and whimpering over past days of relative abundance does not make sense.

The care of every single dinar, in the opinion of the military as well as others, must become a constant preoccupation at every level of command.

The proposed Federal budget clearly does not create much optimism in the military that personal income will increase, that housing problems will be resolved, that the loss of professional staff will completely stop. ... In this contest between the desired and the real it is obvious the Yugoslav Army is facing another year of withholdings, savings, and limitations.

In a recent conversation with POBJEDA correspondents, a navy commander pointed out that soldiers and officers live on the verge of hardship. As an example, he noted that his border guards are allowed to wear their military boots only for two months although they sign to be responsible for them throughout their military service. The lack of many common military items caused by the sanctions has significantly affected the material well-being of the Yugoslav Army. Therefore peace, the removal of international-community sanctions, and the stabilization of the dinar would certainly improve the economic situation in the country. This in turn would have a positive effect on the country's defense.

Serbia

Draskovic Announces Rally Against One-Party Rule

LD0702181495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1435 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 7 Feb (TANJUG)—Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] Chairman Vuk

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Draskovic told a news conference in Belgrade today that his four-day visit to Great Britain was very successful.

"Two issues dominated my talks with British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, his deputy Douglas Hogg, and Yugoslav heir Aleksandar: First, how to restore peace as soon as possible, and how to achieve a democratic, European Serbia," Draskovic said.

"In all my meetings I urged the consistent SPO policy: yes to peace, no to totalitarianism and resurgence of one-party dictatorship," he stressed.

The SPO chairman said that he has invited parliamentary opposition political parties, united branch TUs "Nezavisnost," Serbian Independent TUs of Farmers, the Independent Association of Journalists, and independent media and universities in Serbia to organize a joint rally against one-party dictatorship in Serbia. He said that "all achievements of the 5 years of struggle for a multiparty and democratic Serbia are being abolished, one after another."

According to him, opposition parties have won all freedoms in Serbia through nonparliamentary pressure, and the only way for the opposition is to combine parliamentary and nonparliamentary methods of democratic struggle in the future.

Replying to questions, Draskovic stressed that an initiative for creating a so-called "working coalition" of opposition parties in local elections does not mean anything, and that it only represents a propaganda slogan launched for the purpose of giving an impression of unity.

He reiterated that the SPO is offering a program for uniting actions of opposition parties at local, republican, and federal levels.

According to Draskovic, the goal is that the united opposition wins a two-third majority in the assembly, which could then be transformed into a constitution-building assembly, and once the constitution and system laws have been changed, new elections would be organized.

Draskovic said that a new international conference on former Yugoslavia can only be successful if Serbs in Bosnia first accept the Contact Group peace plan, which is the only solution for ending the war, he added.

He stressed that no "reserve" peace plan exists and that he believes the Pale leadership does not have access to many details (it is unable to learn about them), which will encourage them to accept the contact Group plan.

Opposition Parties Agree To Cooperate in Elections

LD0702165995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1523 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 7 Feb (TANJUG)—Representatives of the four largest opposition parties in Serbia reached agreement today on cooperation at local government level and announced that in a few days time an agreement will be signed on this.

Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), Zoran Djindjic, chairman of the Democratic Party (DS), Vojislav Kostunica, chairman of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), and Milan Mikovic, member of the Main Committee of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), expressed satisfaction at a joint news conference with the results of the talks, which were hosted by the SRS.

The details of the agreement, it was said, will be made public only after the text of the cooperation agreement has been agreed definitively.

Seselj stated that they discussed all elements of cooperation at the local level, and added that the agreement envisages two variants of cooperation—one in the event that the old laws remain in force, with two rounds in the local elections, and the other in the event of a new law being adopted.

The radicals' leader assessed that there has been a noticeable "step forward" in the coordination of the opposition stances and stressed that in the talks "in principle nothing was in dispute;" there only remains for some matters to be cleared up.

Kostunica stressed that this is an agreement on the joint appearance of the parties in the local elections: joint candidates will be submitted. He assessed the existence of political agreement among the parties on this as being significant. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Union Leader Warns Province of Colonialism

AU0702165195 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 6 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kosova is being turned into a territory with colonialist characteristics, Dr. Hajrulla Gorani, chairman of the Independent Trade Unions of Kosova, said in an interview for the Prishtina newspaper BUJKU.

Gorani said that the Kosovar working class is in a grave situation. Serbian plans for the ethnic cleansing of working positions have been almost completely carried out, while a great part of the property from the Kosova economy has been transferred from Kosova to Serbia. He said that Kosova is being turned into a territory with colonialist characteristics according to Serbo-Montenegrin plans. The accomplishment of such plans has ousted Albanians from their jobs and they are now facing destitution and all the other evils of general unemployment, Gorani stresses in the BUJKU interview.

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Association Wants To Stop Albanian 'Exodus'

AU0702164995 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 6 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Kosovar Association for the Return of Evicted Albanians organized an open discussion on this topic in Shtimje. Association Chairman Jahja Lluka, Deputy Chairman Ramadan Kupina, Dr. Masar Rizvanolli, and representatives of Albanian political parties in Shtimje Commune attended the meeting. Mehmet Haziri has the following report from Prishtina:

[Haziri] The issue of the exodus of Albanians has become yet another wound for Kosova occupied by the Belgrade expansionists. Hysni Baftiu, chairman of the Shtimje association, said that over the last two years, 827 Albanians have abandoned this Kosovar commune, of whom over 100 left due to military and police pursuits. It is a distressing fact that there are dozens of pupils and teachers, intellectuals and activists among those evicted. A total of 1,040 plots of land have been obtained for those who would like to return to Kosova, but only 16 citizens have come back so far.

Jahja Lluka, chairman of the Kosovar Association for the Return of Evicted Albanians, stressed that despite the public sensitiveness to exodus consequences, we are lacking state management of this phenomenon and a common strategy against it by Kosovar political institutions.

Mr. Lluka pointed out the danger of Serbian scenarios for the recolonization of Kosova and demanded better coordination of the cooperation of political and intellectual institutions to stop the exodus of Albanians, thus supporting President Rugova's pledges on this issue. [passage omitted]

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